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THE ANCIENT MARINER OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: THE HISTORICAL, YET DECLINING  
ROLE OF NAVIGABILITY 
ROBERT W. ADLER

 
It is an ancyent Mariner, 
And he stoppeth one of three: 
―By thy long grey beard and thy glittering eye 
―Now wherefore stoppest thou me?1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
―Navigability‖2—the degree to which a particular water body can be 
used by various boats and other watercraft—has a long, important history 
in federal constitutional and statutory law.
3
 U.S. Supreme Court cases 
involving navigability
4
 helped to shape the scope of federal authority 
under the Commerce Clause
5
 and the Necessary and Proper Clause
6
 of the 
U.S. Constitution. The legal concept of navigability has also been critical 
 
 
  James I. Farr Chair and Distinguished Professor, Interim Dean, University of Utah, S.J. 
Quinney College of Law. I would like to thank Landon Corey Newell for his research assistance on 
this Article, and Professor Robin Kundis Craig for excellent comments. 
 1. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Rime of the Ancyent Marinere, in WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, 
LYRICAL BALLADS, AND OTHER POEMS, 1797–1800, at 769 (James Butler & Karen Green eds., 1992). 
 2. Generally speaking, ―navigability‖ refers to the degree to which a particular body of water 
can be used by various kinds of boats and other watercraft for purposes ranging from recreation to 
commerce to national defense. As explained extensively below, however, the Supreme Court has used 
slightly different definitions or legal tests of navigability for different constitutional purposes. See 
infra notes 34–36 and accompanying text for a preliminary discussion. 
 3. See Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical 
Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don’t Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
513, 569–96 (1975). Navigability under state law is also important for purposes to define riparian 
rights, see, e.g., Thompson v. Enz, 154 N.W.2d 473 (Mich. 1967), title as between the state and private 
parties, see, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821), or recreational access, see, e.g., Arkansas v. 
McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659 (Ark. 1980). For more on the importance of navigability under state law, see 
generally Robert Haskell Abrams, Governmental Expansion of Recreational Water Use Opportunities, 
59 OR. L. REV. 159 (1980); Leighton L. Leighty, The Source and Scope of Public and Private Rights 
in Navigable Waters, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 391, 398 (1970) (identifying state law purposes for 
navigability test). This Article focuses on the role of navigability in federal law. 
 4. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855) 
(upholding an Act of Congress authorizing a bridge over the Ohio River as valid exercise of 
Commerce Clause authority); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824) (―The power over 
commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the people of America 
adopted their government, and must have been contemplated in forming it.‖). 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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in defining private versus public property rights in water bodies,
7
 
allocating property between the federal and state governments,
8
 and 
delineating the scope of Article III federal court admiralty jurisdiction.
9
 
Navigability also played a key role in the evolution of various common 
law doctrines, and the connections between those doctrines and the 
Constitution remain unclear.
10
 
Given this pedigree, to borrow from the poet Coleridge, wherefore 
should we stop today to question the relevance of navigability to 
constitutional law? In several ways the role of navigability in 
constitutional law began to decline long ago. Dramatic changes in the U.S. 
economy and in our understanding and valuation of aquatic ecosystems 
and resources help explain why navigability may be even less important 
today than it has been in the past. The role and significance of 
navigability, however, varies greatly depending on the purpose of the 
differing legal doctrines for which it is used.  
During its October 2011 term, for the first time in more than three 
decades,
11
 the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case
12
 about the meaning of 
the term ―navigability‖ to establish ―navigability for title,‖ i.e., whether a 
state holds title to the beds and banks of its waterways under the equal 
footing doctrine of the U.S. Constitution
13
 and for purposes of the public 
trust doctrine as defined by that state‘s law.14 The Court granted certiorari 
 
 
 7. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855) (upholding state regulatory 
authority to protect oyster beds within navigable waters); Martin v. Waddell‘s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 
Pet.) 367 (1842) (confirming state public trust ownership of the beds of navigable waters). 
 8. See, e.g., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) (holding under the equal footing 
doctrine that newly admitted states have same rights to title to beds of navigable waters as original 
thirteen states, and that prior to statehood the federal government held title those lands temporarily, in 
trust for future states). 
 9. See, e.g., The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851) (extending 
federal admiralty jurisdiction from waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide to all waters that are 
―navigable in fact‖). 
 10. See generally Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Writs to Rights: “Navigability” and the Transformation 
of the Common Law in the Nineteenth Century, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049 (2002); T. E. Lauer, The 
Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, 28 MO. L. REV. 60 (1963). 
 11. The last case in which the Court actually addressed the definition of navigability is Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (finding Hawaiian coastal pond with artificially improved 
access to Mauna Loa Bay navigable for Commerce Clause authority but not for federal navigational 
servitude). More recent cases address navigability for other purposes. See, e.g., Idaho v. United States, 
533 U.S. 262 (2001) (finding intent in federal treaty to reserve beds of navigable waters for Tribe); 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (confirming state ownership of lands 
submerged by tidal but non-navigable waters). 
 12. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012). 
 13. See Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 212. 
 14. See Martin v. Waddell‘s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). The so-called ―public trust 
doctrine‖ is really a series of state-defined doctrines, although scholars continue to debate whether 
federal law ultimately establishes the doctrine‘s minimum parameters. See Robin Kundis Craig, A 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/3
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on the single issue of whether the Montana Supreme Court applied the 
correct federal legal standard
15
 for determining whether the Missouri, 
Clark Fork, and Madison Rivers were navigable at the time of statehood.
16
 
Petitioner PPL Montana (PPL) raised three narrow challenges to the 
Montana Supreme Court‘s approach to determining navigability for title: 
first, whether the Montana court focused on the navigability of particular 
river segments rather than the river as a whole; second, whether the 
Montana court erred by considering evidence of current-day navigability 
as probative of navigability at statehood; and third, whether the Montana 
court employed too liberal a standard for navigability.
17
 The U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled unanimously in PPL‘s favor on the first two issues,18 holding 
that the seventeen-mile Great Falls reach of the Missouri River was not 
navigable for title and remanding with respect to the remaining disputed 
segments.
19
 Given the Court‘s unanimous decision on evidentiary grounds, 
why is this case important? 
 
 
Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, 
and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 4–10 (2007). In PPL Montana, the Supreme Court 
reiterated earlier holdings that federal law controls the navigability for title test for purposes of the 
equal footing doctrine, but that state law governs the scope of the public trust doctrine within 
individual states. PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct at 1235. 
 15. Navigability for state ownership is a question of federal law, Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 
9, 10 (1971), because it governs the extent to which the federal government conveyed title to states at 
the time of statehood. See United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931). 
 16. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 131 S. Ct. 3019 (2011) (granting certiorari). Montana was 
admitted as a state in 1889. PPL Montana, LLC v. State, 229 P.3d 421, 428 (Mont. 2010). The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on only the first issue in the Petition: 
Does the constitutional test for determining whether a section of a river is navigable for title 
purposes require a trial court to determine, based on evidence, whether the relevant stretch of 
the river was navigable at the time the State joined the Union as directed by United States v. 
Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931), or may the court simply deem the river as a whole generally 
navigable based on evidence of present-day recreational use, with the question ―very liberally 
construed‖ in the State‘s favor? 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i–ii, PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (No. 10-218), 2010 WL 3236721 
at *i. 
 17. PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1226. 
 18. The Court held that the ―primary flaw‖ in the Montana Supreme Court reasoning was its 
failure to engage in a segment-by-segment analysis to decide whether the disputed river segments were 
navigable at statehood, so long as each segment is sufficiently discrete and defined to warrant analysis. 
Id. at 1229–31. The Court found that present-day use may be considered, but only if it ―shows the river 
could sustain the kinds of commercial use that, as a realistic matter, might have occurred at the time of 
statehood.‖ Id. at 1233. 
 19. Id. at 1232–33. Given these holdings, the Supreme Court found no need to reach the burden 
of proof issue. Id. at 1234. For additional summaries and analysis of the decision, see Rachael 
Lipinski, Note, The Dividing Line: Applying the Navigability-for-Title Test After PPL Montana, 91 OR. 
L. REV. 247 (2012) (arguing that the legal test for waters deemed navigable for title is not as clear as it 
might seem after PPL Montana); Amy Wegner Kho, Case Note, What Lies Beneath Troubled Waters: 
The Determination of Navigable Rivers in PPL Montana LLC v. Montana, 132 S. CT. 1215, 15 U. 
DENV. WATER L. REV. 489 (2012) (describing case and holding). 
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At a basic level, PPL Montana will dictate the litigation burden states 
will bear in proving navigability for title, and in some cases, their ability to 
do so at all. In PPL Montana, the State offered as evidence a fascinating 
set of historical records, including the journals of the Lewis and Clark 
expedition,
20
 which navigated many of the waters in question in dugout 
canoes in the early nineteenth century.
21
 PPL argued that historical records 
and expert affidavits regarding authenticity were inadmissible hearsay 
because no one alive today can testify to the validity of historical accounts 
based on personal knowledge.
22
 If neither historical records nor current 
evidence of navigability may be used, however, it is not clear what 
evidence would be both probative and admissible on the issue of 
navigability at statehood, making it difficult if not impossible for a state to 
prove its case.
23
 Except perhaps in Alaska
24
 and Hawaii,
25
 no one alive 
today can testify to navigability at statehood based on personal knowledge 
or observation.
26
 
The Montana courts rejected PPL‘s hearsay objection,27 and the U.S. 
Supreme Court has also decided navigability cases using similar historical 
evidence.
28
 For most waterways, however, states do not have the luxury of 
relying on the most famous journals of exploration in U.S. history to prove 
their case. Historical records of navigation may be sparse or nonexistent 
for many water bodies. According to one survey, only three states have 
conducted comprehensive inventories of navigable streams, and those 
inventories were based on cursory examinations of available historical 
records.
29
 Because settlement was often sparse at statehood, the relevant 
legal test is the susceptibility to navigation at statehood rather than actual 
 
 
 20. See PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1223. 
 21. See generally STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, UNDAUNTED COURAGE: MERIWETHER LEWIS, THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, AND THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1996). 
 22. PPL Montana, LLC v. State, 229 P.3d 421, 434–35 (Mont. 2010). 
 23. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 416 (1940) (―Use of a 
stream long abandoned by water commerce is difficult to prove by abundant evidence.‖). 
 24. Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989).  
 25. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
 26. Congress admitted Alaska and Hawaii as states in 1959. The next newest states are New 
Mexico and Arizona, which entered the Union as states in 1912, meaning any credible fact witnesses 
would now have to be well over 100 years old. See Statehood Dates, 50STATES.COM, http://www.50 
states.com/statehood.htm (last visited June 15, 2012). 
 27. PPL Montana, LLC, 229 P.3d at 434–38. 
 28. See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10–12 (1971) (discussing historical evidence of use of 
Great Salt Lake for navigation); The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 440 (1874) (discussing use of 
Fox River by explorers Marquette and Joliet as well as later traders). 
 29. Bruce B. Dykaar & David A. Schrom, Public Ownership of U.S. Streambeds and 
Floodplains: A Basis for Ecological Stewardship, 53 BIOSCIENCE No. 4, at 2, 3 (2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/3
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commercial use.
30
 Evidence of the physical condition of a waterway at 
statehood, however, will be even more scant if no one plied those waters at 
the time and therefore left no records to be evaluated. If evidence of 
current-day navigability is not admissible, it will be increasingly difficult 
to prove navigability for title.
31
 
Aside from the economic stakes at issue in PPL Montana,
32
 and the 
possible effects on similar litigation nationwide,
33
 litigation over the 
meaning and significance of ―navigability‖ suggests (but does not formally 
raise) a far more serious question: What is—or should be—the continuing 
role of navigability as a central tenet of U.S. constitutional law? In 
addition to the navigability for title test, slightly different navigability tests 
govern the scope of: (1) federal authority under the Commerce Clause,
34
 
(2) the federal navigational servitude,
35
 and (3) admiralty jurisdiction 
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
36
 The fact that the Supreme 
Court has adopted multiple definitions of navigability may not be 
 
 
 30. See United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82 (1931) (clarifying that ―where conditions of 
exploration and settlement explain the infrequency or limited nature of such use, the susceptibility to 
use as a highway of commerce may still be satisfactorily proved‖ (emphasis added)); The Daniel Ball, 
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870) (holding that waters ―are navigable in fact when they are used, or 
are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade 
and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water‖ (emphasis 
added)). 
 31. See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source 
and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 446 (1989) (arguing ―that the Court bought 
into one and a half centuries of maddening litigation with many more years to come‖); Leighty, supra 
note 3, at 393 (asking whether navigability ―is so inherently unworkable that it can no longer be 
employed as a meaningful standard‖); id. at 437 (suggesting that evidence of navigability ―becomes 
increasingly more difficult to obtain with the passing of years‖). 
 32. The Montana courts awarded $40 million in damages for past use of waterways without 
compensation, and the right to collect millions of dollars in future royalties. PPL Montana, 229 P.3d at 
429–33. The Edison Electric Institute, the American Petroleum Institute, and the Solicitor General of 
the United States believed that the stakes were high enough to weigh in as amicus curiae. See Docket, 
PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012) (No. 10-218), available at http://www 
.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-218.htm. 
 33. Litigation is pending in Utah regarding hundreds of stream miles following a Utah Supreme 
Court decision granting partial public access rights to non-navigable streams, Conatser v. Johnson, 
194 P.3d 897 (Utah 2009) (finding public easement over non-navigable waters), and the legislative 
response thereto. Similar litigation has occurred in other states. See, e.g., Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. 
Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 166–69 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (overturning blanket state legislation 
to eliminate state ownership); Pa. Dep‘t. of Envtl. Prot. v. Espy, 4 Pa. D. & C. 5th 25 (Pa. Comm. Pl. 
2007) (finding portion of Little Juniata River navigable and by the Commonwealth); Dykaar & 
Schrom, supra note 29, at 3 (discussing legislative debate in Alaska over ownership of more than 
22,000 streams and one million lakes). 
 34. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Ashwander v. Tenn. 
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936). 
 35. See United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).  
 36. See The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). 
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surprising given the diverse constitutional origins and purposes of these 
doctrines. Each doctrine dates to a time when rivers and other waterways 
were our most important avenues of commerce.
37
 In those times, 
navigability was one of the most critical defining characteristics of a 
waterway, if not the most important. A navigability test made sense in 
defining which waters should be subject to public ownership and in 
delineating which waters should be subject to federal or state legislative 
and judicial control. 
Many inland U.S. waterways continue to serve as major avenues of 
commerce.
38
 Through the lens of twenty-first century science and values, 
however, rivers and other waters serve a much broader range of public 
purposes and provide important ecosystem services,
39
 such as water 
supply,
40
 biodiversity and habitat,
41
 fish and wildlife production,
42
 
recreational use,
43
 flood control and watershed protection,
44
 and pollution 
assimilation.
45
 Under the public trust doctrine, states hold title to protect, 
pursuant to state law, common resources for the public at large, for 
purposes that typically include navigation but also fisheries and 
commerce.
46
 Under modern state cases the doctrine can encompass 
 
 
 37. See Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 431–38; Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: 
The Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1217–20 (1954); see 
generally GILBERT C. FITE & JIM E. REESE, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 63–64, 
188–95 (2d ed. 1965) (describing importance of water transportation to early American commerce). 
 38. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. INLAND WATERWAYS 
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 8 (2005) (describing over 12,000 miles of navigable waters serving major 
commercial transportation functions in 41 states, carrying nearly 2.5 quadrillion short tons of products 
per year), available at http://www.corpsnets.us/docs/other/05-NETS-R-12.pdf.  
 39. See generally J. B. RUHL, STEVEN E. KRAFT & CHRISTOPHER L. LANT, THE LAW AND 
POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2007); NATURE‘S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL 
ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997) [hereinafter NATURE‘S SERVICES]. 
 40. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ESTIMATED WATER USE IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2005, at 
4 (2009), available at http://www.corpsnets.us/docs/other/05-NETS-R-12.pdf; see also Sandra Postel 
& Stephen Carpenter, Freshwater Ecosystem Services, in NATURE‘S SERVICES, supra note 39, at 195, 
196–98. 
 41. See ROBIN A. ABELL ET AL., FRESHWATER ECOREGIONS OF NORTH AMERICA, A 
CONSERVATION ASSESSMENT 25–58 (2000) (assessing biodiversity functions of North American 
freshwater ecosystems); Postel & Carpenter, supra note 40, at 204–06; ELLEN E. WOHL, 
DISCONNECTED RIVERS: LINKING RIVERS TO LANDSCAPES 26–29 (2004); Kristine Ciruna & David 
Braun, Freshwater Fundamentals: Watersheds, Freshwater Ecosystems and Freshwater Biodiversity, 
in A PRACTITIONER‘S GUIDE TO FRESHWATER BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION 11, 23–35 (Nicole Silk 
& Kristine Ciruna eds., 2004). 
 42. Postel & Carpenter, supra note 40, at 198–99. 
 43. Id. at 202–04. 
 44. Ciruna & Braun, supra note 41, at 12–23. 
 45. Postel & Carpenter, supra note 40, at 200–01. 
 46. See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 71, 74–75 (1855) (public fisheries included in trust purposes).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/3
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ecological values as well, and earlier scholars have urged that it be 
extended to protect other uses and values.
47
 But these issues of scope differ 
from the nature of water bodies reached by the public trust doctrine. In 
Commerce Clause cases, for which navigation played such an important 
early role,
48
 navigation has faded into the background relative to other 
public values.
49
 Yet the Supreme Court continues to struggle with 
Congress‘s continued use of the term ―navigable waters‖ in federal statutes 
enacted under Commerce Clause authority, most recently the Clean Water 
Act.
50
 The Court remains split over the jurisdictional role of navigability 
under those statutes, and while the Court thus far has addressed the scope 
of the Clean Water Act largely on statutory grounds, the Commerce 
Clause implications have lurked in the background.
51
 
For purposes of public versus private ownership, why do we continue 
to litigate whether a water body was navigable at statehood, which in most 
cases involves evidence of navigability dating back one to two centuries?
52
 
What is the continuing significance of navigability to Commerce Clause 
jurisdiction when far more commerce is conducted over the Internet 
highway than on aquatic highways? Navigability is intuitively far more 
 
 
 47. See Nat‘l Audubon Soc‘y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Ca. 1983); Joseph L. Sax, The 
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 
(1970). For articles urging the substantive expansion of the public trust doctrine (as opposed to its 
geographic scope), see, for example, Jack H. Archer & Terrance W. Stone, The Interaction of the 
Public Trust and the “Takings” Doctrines: Protecting Wetlands and Critical Coastal Areas, 20 VT. L. 
REV. 81 (1995); Craig, supra note 14; Ralph W. Johnson & William G. Galloway, Protection of 
Biodiversity under the Public Trust Doctrine, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 21 (1994); Ralph W. Johnson, Water 
Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 485 (1989). 
 48. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855); 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824). 
 49. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940) (holding that 
federal Commerce Clause regulation of waterways extends beyond navigation to include purposes 
such as flood control watershed protection, and power production). 
 50. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2012). 
 51. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (4–1–4 split opinions on 
interpretation of statutory term ―waters of the United States‖); Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng‘rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (split opinions on interpretation of same term). 
 52. At oral argument in PPL Montana several justices posed similar queries, probing whether 
different navigability tests properly distinguished between their purposes. See Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 18, PPL Montana, LLC v. State, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012) (No. 10-218) (Justice Kagan 
asking how navigability for title test differs from those used for regulatory purposes); id. at 31–32 
(Justice Scalia asking whether a ―whole river‖ approach makes more sense for Commerce Clause than 
for title); id. at 40 (Justice Breyer asking whether Commerce Clause cases are relevant to title cases). 
The Justices also asked whether navigability remains relevant to the purposes for which it is used. See 
id. at 32–33 (Justice Alito questioning rationale for rule that states own navigable rivers); id. at 33–35 
(Justices Alito and Scalia probing what navigability has to do with fishing and regulatory purposes for 
which states seek control); id. at 38–39 (Chief Justice Roberts asking why states need ownership to 
control navigability); id. at 51–53 (Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia probing whether states can 
exercise necessary regulatory control with or without title to waterways). 
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relevant to the scope of the federal navigational servitude and federal 
admiralty jurisdiction. Even in those areas, however, the role of 
navigability has diminished, perhaps because the law in those areas has 
been well settled
53
 but also because of questions about the relationship 
between those doctrines and Commerce Clause authority. To borrow 
another phrase from The Rime of the Ancyent Marinere, to what extent is 
navigability an albatross around the neck of U.S. constitutional law?
54
 And 
does the answer to that question differ for each of the navigability 
doctrines depending on their distinct purposes and historical evolution? 
Changing the focus of the legal tests for any of these doctrines, of 
course, could have significant implications for settled property rights and 
expectations,
55
 and for the balance of power between the federal and state 
governments.
56
 For example, if the scope of the federal navigational 
servitude expands to encompass waters that serve public values and 
functions beyond navigability, the federal government‘s obligation to 
compensate those with property rights in those waters would be reduced 
accordingly. Broadening the title test could enhance state authority if it 
resulted in state ownership of more waterways, but it could also expand 
federal authority relative to the states if courts recognized an even wider 
range of public interests in waters under the Commerce Clause. The 
Supreme Court has altered the scope of each of these doctrines in the 
past,
57
 in some cases dramatically, to reflect changing conditions. 
 
 
 53. The last major U.S. Supreme Court case regarding the definition of navigability for admiralty 
jurisdiction was Ex parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629, 631–32 (1884) (approving federal admiralty 
jurisdiction over artificial waterways used in interstate commerce). The last similar cases for purposes 
of the federal navigational servitude were Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) and its 
companion case Vaughn v. Vermillion Corp., 444 U.S. 206 (1979). 
 54.  
Ah wel-a-day! what evil looks 
Had I from old and young; 
Instead of the Cross the Albatross 
About my neck was hung. 
Coleridge, supra note 1, at 774.  
 55. See, e.g., Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 632–33 (1900) (declining to extend 
navigability for purposes of the federal navigational servitude at expense of private property rights). 
 56. See, e.g., Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865) (addressing the 
relationship between federal Commerce Clause authority over navigable waters and state power under 
the dormant Commerce Clause); Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847) (addressing federal 
admiralty jurisdiction relative to the jurisdiction of state and local courts); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 
How.) 212, 230 (1845) (discussing the public trust doctrine as an allocation of rights between the 
federal and state governments).  
 57. Compare The Steam-Boat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825) (limiting 
federal admiralty jurisdiction to waters influenced by the ebb and flow of the tide), with The Propeller 
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851) (extending federal admiralty jurisdiction to 
all inland waters deemed navigable in fact), and The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870) 
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This Article evaluates the continuing relevance of navigability in 
federal constitutional law for purposes of title, admiralty jurisdiction, 
Commerce Clause authority, and the federal navigational servitude. Part II 
explores the history and evolution of navigability in U.S. constitutional 
law, and examines each doctrine for evidence of the relative extent to 
which navigability continues to play a role and the degree to which that 
role has changed or declined. Part III examines other compelling reasons 
that suggest that navigability—while retaining relevance in certain 
contexts—should have less influence on some doctrines to reflect new 
understanding and shifting values about the importance of aquatic 
ecosystems and resources. Those differences reflect the very different 
functions that the concept of navigability serves in U.S. law. For purposes 
of admiralty jurisdiction, it delineates the exclusive role of federal courts 
in resolving particular disputes. For purposes of the Commerce Clause, it 
identifies the potential, but discretionary and often nonexclusive, scope of 
federal regulatory authority. Under the equal footing doctrine, it helps to 
define the extent of state sovereignty relative to that of the federal 
government, and to ensure constitutional equality among the states. Part 
IV concludes that constitutional definitions of navigability legitimately 
vary according to purpose, but argues that the geographic limits of public 
waters, for which unbridled private ownership is not appropriate, should 
reflect the full range of uses and values that serve important public 
interests to the fullest extent consistent with the underlying purpose of 
each doctrine.  
II. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL NAVIGABILITY LAW 
Courts deciding navigability for title cases often examine the history of 
land grants and other conveyances in light of surrounding historical 
circumstances.
58
 Aside from that specific, functional use of history, there 
 
 
(defining federal authority for Commerce Clause purposes as waters that are used, or are susceptible 
for use in interstate or foreign commerce), with United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 
U.S. 690 (1899) (upholding federal regulatory authority over dam on non-navigable portion of stream 
where reduced water levels would impair navigability downstream), and Okla. ex rel. Phillips v. Guy 
F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941) (upholding federal flood control project on non-navigable 
tributary to navigable river). 
 58. See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell‘s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 407–14 (1842) (evaluating 
intent of Charles II in granting colonial lands to the Duke of York); Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 221–
25 (construing deeds of cession from Georgia and Virginia to United States, and land purchases from 
France and Spain); Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 435–36 (1867) (considering title to 
previously submerged lands in San Francisco in light of history of transfer of lands from Mexico and 
authority of U.S. military governor with respect to such lands); Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196, 
223–51 (1899) (evaluating claims by heirs of Chief Justice John Marshall and his brother James 
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are several historical reasons why navigability developed as a core concept 
in each of the distinct but related federal doctrines for which it is used. 
First, early American courts, which routinely adopted or modified legal 
precedent from England,
59
 determined that principles of English law were 
relevant to property rights in water bodies.
60
 Second, navigability 
developed as an independent component of U.S. constitutional 
jurisprudence for several distinct purposes—including Commerce Clause 
power and federal admiralty jurisdiction—in part because of the same or 
similar inherited doctrines of English law and in part because water-based 
transportation was such an important force in American expansion and 
economic development. Third, navigability became the basis for 
expectations regarding certain federally recognized property rights. For all 
of these purposes, the U.S. Supreme Court modified earlier legal doctrines 
to reflect different geographic, political, and economic realities in the 
expanding United States, as well as different and evolving notions of 
economic liberty. 
Several scholars have probed the historical underpinnings of 
navigability doctrines
61
 and at times criticized the accuracy with which 
early American courts interpreted and applied English precedent.
62
 My 
goal is neither to revisit nor to critique those analyses; it is to explore the 
historical reasons for the evolution of federal navigability law in order to 
evaluate the degree to which they continue to support the relevance of 
navigability today. 
A. Public and Private Rights in Water Bodies  
For two compelling reasons, early American courts relied on English 
navigability precedent to decide cases regarding riparian ownership rights,
63
 
 
 
Marshall according to land grants from Charles I and James II, and historical documents laying out 
plans for Washington, D.C.). 
 59. The colonies remained subject to British political authority, and therefore British law, prior to 
independence. More generally, early American courts naturally inherited English common law as the 
basis for their jurisprudence. See Hulsebosch, supra note 10, at 1063. 
 60. See Craig, supra note 14, at 11–14.  
 61. See Hulsebosch, supra note 10; Lauer, supra note 10; MacGrady, supra note 3.  
 62. See, e.g., Hulsebosch, supra note 10, at 1081–85 (arguing that American courts and lawyers 
blurred distinctions and misunderstood relevant English law); MacGrady, supra note 3, at 546–47 
(arguing that early American courts misconstrued the state of English law and practice on issues of 
riverbed ownership and admiralty jurisdiction); Note, supra note 37, at 1216–17 (accusing early 
American courts of relying on ―dubious interpretations of English authorities‖).  
 63. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53 (1851); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 
1821). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/3
  
 
 
 
 
2013] DECLINING ROLE OF NAVIGABILITY 1653 
 
 
 
 
fisheries,
64
 water to run mills,
65
 and navigation.
66
 The first reason relates to 
protection of private property interests, while the second ensures access to 
public resources in water and waterways. Ironically, these two reasons 
reflect competing English principles of liberty, which pointed in opposite 
directions regarding rights in waterways. 
British subjects in North America (and later U.S. citizens) retained a 
strong belief in private property rooted in the political philosophy of John 
Locke.
67
 Locke proposed that the public at large benefitted from the 
incentives associated with private property, because if landowners reaped 
profits by combining their labor and property, society as a whole would 
benefit from the resulting increase in productivity.
68
 Landless individuals 
saw in the New World the opportunity to earn the benefit of liberty 
accompanying property ownership that was not available in England. 
Settlers faced substantial physical risks—and often a period of indentured 
servitude—traveling to and establishing homes, farms, and cities on a new 
continent with a hostile environment to obtain private property, which at 
the time was largely limited in England to the ruling class.
69
 It was not 
surprising, then, that many American courts inherited the English doctrine 
that riparian landowners held ownership rights to the beds and banks of 
non-navigable waters and limited, but still important, rights of access to 
navigable waters.
70
 Waterfront property was valuable because of those 
rights and the economic and other opportunities they afforded. An 
important function of Anglo-American law is to protect expectations and 
 
 
 64. See, e.g., Hooker v. Cummings, 20 Johns. 90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822); Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 
475 (Pa. 1810). 
 65. See, e.g., Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827); Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. 
307 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
 66. See, e.g., Gavit‘s Adm‘rs v. Chambers, 3 Ohio 495 (1828). 
 67. See NIALL FERGUSON, CIVILIZATION, THE WEST AND THE REST 108–12 (2011) (discussing 
the influence of Locke‘s 1690 Second Treatise of Government on political and economic development 
in the North American colonies).  
 68. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and Private Land, 23 ECOL. L.Q. 631, 634 (1996); 
Terry W. Frazier, Protecting Ecological Integrity Within the Balancing Function of Property Law, 28 
ENVTL. L. 53, 83–85 (1998) (explaining theory that property ownership protects individual liberty). 
Both Freyfogle and Frazier, however, argued that ownership should apply only to the value added, and 
not to the land itself. Freyfogle, supra, at 637; Frazier, supra, at 54, 61–62; see also Eric T. Freyfogle, 
Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1269, 1276, 1288 (1993) (arguing that property 
rights apply only as against other people, not the land itself and its associated nonhuman resources).  
 69. See FERGUSON, supra note 67, at 110–12.  
 70. See, e.g., Middleton v. Pritchard, 3 Scam. 510 (Ill. 1842) (affirming private ownership of 
beds of Mississippi River); Palmer, 3 Cai. 307 (finding public ownership only in beds of tidally-
affected waters). See generally William R. Tillinghast, Note, Tide-Flowed Lands and Riparian Rights 
in the United States, 18 HARV. L. REV. 341 (1905) (reviewing early cases and competing doctrines).  
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values in private property, to protect liberty, and to provide the certainty 
necessary to support investment.
71
 
The second compelling reason, an equally important but competing 
liberty interest, had also evolved in England, although with a somewhat 
unclear history.
72
 English law guaranteed common access to ―public 
waters‖ for purposes such as navigation, commerce, and fishing; in the 
United States, this principle evolved into the public trust doctrine.
73
 
Despite its reincarnation in the late twentieth century to protect shared 
environmental resources and values,
74
 some scholars view the ancestral 
public trust doctrine as more of an early, property law-based antitrust 
policy, which discouraged monopolization of common resources by a 
select few at the discretion of the Crown, which granted privileges based 
on personal favoritism and other reasons.
75
  
Locke‘s economic liberty rationale does not necessarily apply to scarce 
resources that are inappropriate for private dominion and control.
76
 
Monopolization of a navigable waterway, for example, might prevent 
goods produced on private lands from reaching markets or allow a 
monopolist to extract extortionist rents for travel, thus artificially raising 
costs to consumers
77
 and reducing the liberty of upstream landowners. 
 
 
 71. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Community and the Market in Modern American Property Law, in 
LAND, PROPERTY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 382, 382 (John F. Richards ed., 2002); Carol M. Rose, 
Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics, 24 ENVTL. L. 1, 3–4 (1994) 
(describing Jeremy Bentham‘s theory that prosperity depends on security of property rights). 
 72. Some courts and scholars trace the history of this doctrine to Roman Law. See, e.g., Idaho v. 
Coeur d‘Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 284 (1997); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11–14 
(1894); Martin v. Waddell‘s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing 
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust 
Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 634–35 (1986); MacGrady, supra note 3, at 517–34; Alison Rieser, 
Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 397–98 (1991); Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 428–30. 
 73. See Lazarus, supra note 72; Sax, supra note 47; Wilkinson, supra note 31. 
 74. See Nat‘l Audubon Soc‘y v. Superior Court., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); Joseph L. Sax, 
Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185 (1980).  
 75. See James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional 
Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 527 (1989) (describing public trust as an easement in property held in 
common by the public); Lazarus, supra note 72 at 633, 635–36 (explaining English precedent to public 
trust doctrine as a property rights means of protecting common resources from domination by 
individual property owners). 
 76. See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of 
Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 310 (2002) (supporting Dunning‘s view); Harrison C. 
Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American Property Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 
517, 522–23 (1989) (arguing scarcity is a critical aspect of public trust doctrine, along with the 
―natural suitability for common use‖); Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, supra note 68, at 1295 
(arguing that Locke‘s theory is justified only where others have equal access to similar resources). 
 77. Arguably, allowing private parties to control avenues of commerce provides an incentive for 
private investment in improvements such as canals. The United States has a long established policy of 
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English law has protected the public right to navigation to varying degrees 
throughout history, although some English cases focused more on the 
concept of public than on navigable waters.
78
 The extent to which English 
courts adopted those principles in various contexts remains in dispute,
79
 
and private rights in waterways abutting private property gained greater 
protection as English property law evolved.
80
 Nevertheless, by the 
sixteenth century, English cases were recognizing access rights in ―public‖ 
or ―navigable‖ rivers, defined in terms of tidal influence or otherwise.81 
Ironically, for reasons similar to those that encouraged refugees from 
England to seek the opportunity to obtain their own property despite 
significant risks and hardship,
82
 increased liberty through public 
ownership of common water bodies was perhaps even more important to 
North American settlers, as noted by Chief Justice Taney in Martin v. 
Waddell’s Lessee:  
Indeed, it could not well have been otherwise; for the men who first 
formed the English settlements, could not have been expected to 
encounter the many hardships that unavoidably attended their 
emigration to the new world, and to people the banks of its bays and 
rivers if the land under the water at their very doors was liable to 
immediate appropriation by another as private property; and the 
settler upon the fast land thereby excluded from its enjoyment, and 
unable to take a shell-fish from its bottom, or fasten there a stake, or 
even bathe in its waters without becoming a trespasser upon the 
rights of another.
83
 
 
 
meeting such common needs through public investment, thus facilitating open access to markets and 
other uses of common resources. See CARTER GOODRICH ET AL., CANALS AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 213–15 (1961) (documenting extensive public expenditures for U.S. canal construction 
between 1815 and 1860); Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP. L.J. 
235, 245 (2003) (describing early investment by New York State in Erie Canal, dramatically reducing 
cost of shipping farm produce). 
 78. See Lauer, supra note 10, at 63 (finding recognition of navigation rights under Anglo-Saxon 
rule); id. at 65 (describing prohibitions on encroachments on public waters); id. at 66–68 (discussing 
Bracton‘s concepts of public waters as common property). 
 79. See MacGrady, supra note 3, at 545–87; Hulsebosch, supra note 10, at 1056–57, 1066–67. 
 80. See Lauer, supra note 10, at 74–78 (describing conflicts over ownership rights recognized by 
Hale in his 1670 treatise De Jure Maris, which was published twenty years before Locke‘s Second 
Treatise of Government).  
 81. See id. at 89–106; Hulsebosch, supra note 10, at 1066–79. 
 82. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 83. Martin v. Waddell‘s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 414 (1842); see also ELWOOD MEAD, 
IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS: A DISCUSSION OF THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL QUESTIONS CREATED BY 
THE GROWTH OF IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE IN THE WEST 264, 365–66 (reprint 1972) (1903), quoted in 
JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES, CASES AND MATERIALS 266 (4th ed. 
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To balance these visions of liberty, some colonies and states modified 
those doctrines to reflect different geographic conditions in North America 
or the different values held by North American settlers. American courts 
clarified that riparian rights included only a usufruct in the water itself, 
which was ―owned‖ either by the State or by no one at all, regardless of 
whether a river or stream was ―navigable‖ for purposes of other property 
rights.
84
 Legislatures in New England adopted the ―Great Ponds‖ 
ordinances, which declared public ownership in ponds of certain defined 
sizes.
85
  
The most significant change involved public ownership and control of 
the large rivers that penetrated North America and played a critical role in 
expanded settlement and economic development. Some early American 
courts retained the traditional lines of riparian ownership as reflected in 
existing English law.
86
 To other courts, the geography of North America 
suggested a significant expansion of public ownership and control to 
encompass all waterways deemed ―navigable in fact‖ as opposed to only 
waters influenced by the ebb and flow of the tide.
87
 Whether or not these 
early American courts correctly interpreted and applied English law, 
American judges clearly believed that navigability was the appropriate 
basis on which to allocate rights in bodies of water.
88
 Given the pivotal 
role of navigable waterways in early North American growth and 
development, that belief was hardly irrational.  
The Supreme Court similarly inherited and later modified the definition 
of navigability to allocate public versus private rights in water bodies. In 
Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, the Supreme Court agreed with the New 
Jersey Supreme Court‘s holding in Arnold v. Mundy89 that, in making 
wholesale land grants in the Colonies to the Duke of York and others, the 
English Monarchs did not convey proprietary title to lands beneath tidal 
waters, but rather conveyed those lands to the grantees in their 
 
 
2006) (―In monarchies streams belong to the crown, and in the early history of irrigation in Italy and 
other parts of Europe, favorites of the rulers were rewarded with grants of streams. But in a republic 
they belong to the people, and ought forever to be kept as public property for the benefit of all who use 
them, and for them alone, such use to be under public supervision and control.‖). 
 84. See Frank J. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 
638, 640 (1957). There was precedent in English law for treating water rights as usufructs. See 
Hulsebosch, supra note 10, at 1067–68 (discussing Blackstone‘s treatment of water rights). 
 85. See MacGrady, supra note 3, at 597; Tillinghast, supra note 70, at 355. 
 86. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 87. See, e.g., Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810); see also Idaho v. Coeur d‘Alene Tribe of 
Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 286 (1997) (citing state cases in Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Alabama, and 
North Carolina rejecting distinction between tidal and other navigable waters). 
 88. See Hulsebosch, supra note 10, at 1090. 
 89. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12–14, 16–17 (N.J. 1821). 
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governmental capacity.
90
 Thus, title to tidal lands remained subject to the 
public trust.
91
 Chief Justice Taney expressly relied on English law while 
distinguishing it based on different conditions in the United States
92: ―The 
laws and institutions of England, the history of the times, the object of the 
charter, the contemporaneous construction given to it, and the usages 
under it, for the century and more which has since elapsed, are all entitled 
to consideration and weight.‖93 Moreover, he rooted his decision in the 
English law idea that public ownership of some waters was as important to 
the protection of liberty as was private ownership of other lands.
94
 Chief 
Justice Taney, however, was equally explicit in clarifying that English law 
should not presumptively govern  
because it has ceased to be a matter of much interest in the United 
States. . . . A grant [of such lands] . . . must therefore manifestly be 
tried and determined by different principles from those which apply 
to grants of the British crown, when the title is held by a single 
individual, in trust for the whole nation.
95
  
In Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, the Supreme Court also addressed two 
related issues of federalism. First, is title to the beds of navigable waters 
an issue of federal or state law? Second, which government holds title to 
lands beneath such waters, and with what authority to convey those lands 
to others? Regarding the choice of law issue, Chief Justice Taney rejected 
an argument that state law should apply, because the case involved grants 
originating in the King of England during the colonial period, and not 
 
 
 90. Martin v. Waddell‘s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 411–12 (1842) (―It is not a deed 
conveying private property to be interpreted by the rules applicable to cases of that description. It was 
an instrument upon which was to be founded the institutions of a great political community; and in that 
light it should be regarded and construed.‖). 
 91. Id. at 409 (noting that the King initially held land ―in his public and regal character as the 
representative of the nation, and in trust for them‖); id. at 416 (holding that any Royal grant intending 
to sever tidal lands from trust must been express); id. at 414–17 (finding no such intent). 
 92. Id. at 410–12. 
 93. Id. at 411. 
 94. Id. at 412 (quoting Lord Hale‘s de Jure Maris regarding the importance of common fishery 
rights except where a private individual had expressly obtained ―a propriety exclusive of that common 
liberty‖). 
 95. Id. at 410–11; see also Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845) (―But 
[Alabama‘s] rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction are not governed by the common law of England as 
it prevailed in the colonies before the Revolution, but as modified by our own institutions.‖); Barney v. 
Keokuk, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 324, 338 (1876) (reaffirming ―the broad differences existing between the 
extent and topography of the British island and that of the American continent‖ as it related to 
navigability for title). 
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solely state-granted rights.
96
 In later cases, the Court confirmed that 
federal law governs the issue of whether a particular water body is 
navigable for title,
97
 even though that holding dictates whether or not a 
state holds title and associated trust responsibilities with respect to the 
lands beneath those waters. 
On the other hand, Chief Justice Taney was equally clear in Martin v. 
Waddell’s Lessee that once navigability for title was determined, state 
ownership of lands submerged by navigable waters was fundamental to 
state sovereignty, subject only to powers ceded by the states to the federal 
government in the Constitution: 
For when the revolution took place, the people of each state became 
themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to 
all their navigable waters and the soils under them, for their own 
common use subject only to the rights since surrendered by the 
Constitution to the general government.
98
 
The Court followed this concept in Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan by holding, 
under the equal footing doctrine of the Constitution, that newly admitted 
states enjoyed the same ownership of the beds of navigable waters as did 
the original states.
99
 The federal government held sovereign lands prior to 
statehood in trust for the future states, and relinquished the lands held 
pursuant to that trust on statehood.
100
 Indeed, the Court articulated its 
decision in Pollard’s Lessee as essential to preserving states‘ rights: 
 
 
 96. Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 418. The Court maintained this position when the issue shifted 
from the interpretation of royal grants to the interpretation of post-independence federal grants, either 
before or after statehood, holding that federal grants must be construed under federal law, even if the 
resulting property rights were later governed by state law. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 
(1894); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669 (1891). 
 97. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931). 
 98. Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410 (emphasis added). 
 99. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 228–29 (―Alabama is, therefore, entitled to the sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over all the territory within her limits, subject to the common law, to the same extent that 
Georgia possessed it before she ceded it to the United States. To maintain any other doctrine, is to 
deny that Alabama has been admitted into the union on an equal footing with the original states, the 
constitution, laws, and compact, to the contrary notwithstanding.‖). 
 100. Id. at 221, 224. The Court later clarified that the federal government‘s authority to convey 
such lands prior to statehood, rather than maintaining them in trust for future states, was limited and 
subject to a negative presumption. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 83–85 
(1922) (upholding federal power to convey lands prior to statehood, but only if for legitimate ―public 
purpose‖); see also Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001); Utah Div. of State Lands v. United 
States, 482 U.S. 193 (1987); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Choctaw Nation v. 
Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970) (finding pre-statehood conveyance against presumption); Shively, 152 
U.S. at 48 (authorizing pre-statehood conveyances ―whenever it becomes necessary to do so in order to 
perform international obligations, or to effect the improvement of such lands for the promotion and 
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To give to the United States the right to transfer to a citizen the title 
to the shores and the soils under the navigable waters, would be 
placing in their hands a weapon which might be wielded greatly to 
the injury of state sovereignty, and deprive the states of the power to 
exercise a numerous and important class of police powers. But in 
the hands of the states this power can never be used so as to affect 
the exercise of any national right of eminent domain or jurisdiction 
with which the United States have been invested by the 
Constitution.
101
 
It was not for another half century, in Packer v. Bird,
102
 that the 
Supreme Court confirmed that state ownership applied to the beds of all 
waters deemed navigable in fact for Commerce Clause purposes under the 
test the Court adopted in The Daniel Ball,
103
 and for the same reasons.
104
 
The Court followed the reasoning of those state courts that had decided 
that the tidewater limitation on state ownership no longer made sense 
given the extensive system of inland navigable waters in the United 
States.
105
  
The Court has ruled consistently thereafter, most recently in PPL 
Montana, that navigability at statehood remains the relevant legal test for 
deciding state ownership of submerged lands.
106
 And once vested with 
title, states are free to dictate or even convey subsequent ownership rights 
to other parties,
107
 so long as they do not impair navigational and other 
 
 
convenience of commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, or to carry out such other 
public purposes appropriate to the objects for which the United States hold the Territory.‖). 
 101. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 230. 
 102. 137 U.S. 661 (1891). 
 103. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870). 
 104. Packer, 137 U.S. at 667 (―The same reasons, therefore, exist in this country for the exclusion 
of the right to private ownership over the soil under navigable waters when they are susceptible of 
being used as highways of commerce in the ordinary modes of trade and travel on water, as when their 
navigability is determined by the tidal test. It is, indeed, the susceptibility to use as highways of 
commerce which gives sanction to the public right of control over navigation upon them, and 
consequently to the exclusion of private ownership, either of the waters or the soils under them.‖). 
 105. Id. at 668–69. The Court had implied as much in Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 324, 
337–38 (1876), with essentially identical reasoning, but because of the precise issue before the Court 
in that case, it actually held only that any subsequent decision regarding rights to navigable waters 
became a matter of state law. 
 106. See PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 
262 (2001); Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935); 
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); 
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922). 
 107. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 40 (1894); see also Or. ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis 
Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977); Fox River Paper Co. v. R.R. Comm‘n of Wis., 274 U.S. 651 
(1927). 
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interests lawfully protected by the federal government.
108
 Nevertheless, 
two significant cases suggest some limitations on the relevance, or at least 
the apparent dominance, of navigability in the state title context.  
First, in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,
109
 the Court clarified 
that states could only divest themselves of submerged trust lands in ways 
that avoided ―substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the 
waters,‖110 which include but are not limited to navigation.111 A number of 
state courts have now ruled that the public trust uses for which those lands 
are protected include a much wider range of public values such as fishing, 
wildlife habitat, ecological values, and even aesthetics,
112
 although the 
Court appears to have backed away from any implication that this aspect 
of Illinois Central was grounded in an irreducible requirement of federal 
law.
113
 This creates a potentially ironic mismatch between the breadth of 
uses and values for which ―public waters‖ are protected, and the use of the 
singular criterion of navigability to determine the waters for which that 
protection applies. The irony might reflect the degree to which 
navigability is used to delineate state sovereignty and the extent to which 
it historically was used as a surrogate for protection of broader public 
rights and interests. As PPL Montana itself demonstrates, navigability 
continues to be used to define state sovereignty relative to the federal 
government and private landowners, but most states that have expanded 
the uses and values protected by the public trust doctrine have largely 
abandoned navigability as the primary test governing the doctrine‘s 
scope.
114
 
Second, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, the Court rejected an 
argument that states only have title to waters that are navigable in fact 
 
 
 108. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381–82 (1891); see also Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 
196, 236 (1899). 
 109. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
 110. Id. at 435. 
 111. Id. at 452–53. 
 112. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606 (Nev. 2011); Nat‘l Parks & Conservation 
Ass‘n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909 (Utah 1993); Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. 
Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 165 n.10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Mont. Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. 
Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984); Nat‘l Audubon Soc. v. Sup. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); 
Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983); Treuting v. Bridge & 
Park Comm‘n of City of Biloxi, 199 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1967). 
 113. See Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926) (finding that Illinois Central 
―was necessarily a statement of Illinois law, but the general principle and the exception have been 
recognized the country over‖). One explanation for the apparent inconsistency is that Illinois Central 
was tried in a federal court prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Because there was no 
Illinois law on the issue, the federal court was free to apply general ―common law.‖ See Tillinghast, 
supra note 70, at 360. 
 114. See Craig, supra note 14, at 17–20. 
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under the Daniel Ball test, holding that states also retain trust ownership 
over non-navigable waters that are subject to the ebb and flow of the 
tide.
115
 The legal basis for the Court‘s holding was that, in The Propeller 
Genesee Chief and Barney v. Keokuk, it intended only to expand the reach 
of state trust ownership to include inland navigable waters, not to 
eliminate trust ownership of tidal but non-navigable waters.
116
 The Court 
clarified the basis for its holding by explaining the broader range of public 
purposes protected by the public trust doctrine:  
[C]ases which have discussed the State‘s public trust interest in 
these lands have described uses of them not related to navigability, 
such as bathing, swimming, recreation, fishing, and mineral 
development. These statements, too, should have made clear that 
the State‘s claims were not limited to lands under navigable 
waterways. Any contrary expectations cannot be considered 
reasonable.
117
 
This raises the logical question of why, when trust ownership over non-
navigable waters can be justified to protect public uses and values beyond 
navigation, the same is not true for non-navigable inland waters. Again, 
states that have expanded the scope of values protected by the public trust 
doctrine have reduced their focus on navigability in defining the 
geographic scope of the doctrine.
118
 
B. The Scope of Article III Admiralty Jurisdiction 
Early British admiralty courts adjudicated cases involving activities on 
the high seas because of sovereign interests in national defense and foreign 
affairs.
119
 But the geographic scope of admiralty jurisdiction was limited in 
two ways. First, at the time the Constitution was adopted, the jurisdiction 
of British admiralty courts was limited to cases involving activities on the 
high seas or on coastal waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.
120
 
 
 
 115. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479–81 (1988). 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at 482. 
 118. See supra note 115. 
 119. See John Barker Waite, Note, Admiralty Jurisdiction and State Waters, 11 MICH. L. REV. 
580, 584–85 (1912–1913). 
 120. See The Steam-Boat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428, 429 (1825) (―[T]he 
Admiralty never pretended to claim, nor could it rightfully exercise any jurisdiction, except in cases 
where the service was substantially performed, or to be performed, upon the sea, or upon waters within 
the ebb and flow of the tide. This is the prescribed limit which it was not at liberty to transcend.‖). 
British admiralty jurisdiction had been broader earlier in history but was eroded by statute in England 
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This limitation contained the Crown‘s judicial power within its reason for 
existence relative to courts of common law:
121
 
Because such matters were connected with the ocean, with foreign 
intercourse, foreign laws, and foreign people, and it was desirable to 
have the law as to them uniform, and administered by those 
possessing some practical acquaintance with such subjects, they 
being, in short, matters extra-territorial, international, and peculiar 
in some degree to the great highway of nations.
122
 
Although asserted as a restraint against federal government—as opposed 
to royal judicial—authority, the U.S. Supreme Court initially adhered 
strictly to this geographic boundary.
123
 
Even with respect to events occurring on tidal waters, admiralty 
jurisdiction was prohibited if the activity occurred infra corpus comitatus, 
or within the boundary of an English county.
124
 This limitation appears to 
have been designed to protect liberty against an overreaching monarchy, in 
particular to preserve the authority of common law courts and the 
associated right to a jury trial.
125
 As explained in Justice Woodbury‘s 
dissent in Waring v. Clark: 
The controversy was not in England, and is not here, a mere 
struggle between salt and fresh water,—sea and lake,—tide and 
ordinary current,—within a county and without,—as a technical 
matter only. 
 But there are imbedded beneath the surface three great questions 
of principle in connection with these topics, which possess the 
 
 
such that ―[b]y the time of the American Revolution, admiralty power and prestige was at its nadir; 
virtually all that remained within its jurisdiction were events occurring exclusively on the high seas.‖ 
Note, supra note 37, at 1216.  
 121. See The Steam-Boat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 429 (placing jurisdictional 
issue in the context of ―the great struggles between the Courts of common law and the Admiralty‖).  
 122. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 471–72 (1847) (Woodbury, J., dissenting); see also 
id. at 489 (Woodbury, J., dissenting). 
 123. United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72 (1838); Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 36 
U.S. (11 Pet.) 175 (1837); Hobart v. Drogan, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 108 (1836); The Steam-Boat Thomas 
Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428. 
 124. Waring, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 453. 
 125. See Milton Conover, The Abandonment of the “Tidewater” Concept of Admiralty 
Jurisdiction in the United States, 38 OR. L. REV. 34, 36 (1958) (noting that the use of nonjury 
admiralty courts was one of the grievances that led to the Revolutionary War). Some commentators 
cite competition for court fees between the two judicial systems as a cynical but more accurate 
explanation. See Wilkinson, supra note 37, at 1216 n.17 (citing 2 PARSONS, MARITIME LAW 471 n.1 
(1859)). 
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gravest constitutional character. And they can hardly be regarded as 
of little consequence here, and assuredly not less than they 
possessed abroad, where they involve, (1.) the abolition of the trial 
by jury over large tracts of country, (2.) the substitution there of the 
civil law and its forms for the common law and statutes of the 
States, (3.) and the encroachment widely on the jurisdiction of the 
tribunals of the State over disputes happening there between its own 
citizens.
126
 
The majority in Waring v. Clark disagreed, however, and rid admiralty 
jurisdiction of the infra corpus comitatus limitation. Admiralty jurisdiction 
in the English colonies was broader than in England at the time, reaching 
―throughout all and every the sea-shores, public streams, ports, fresh-water 
rivers, creeks and arms, as well of the sea as of the rivers and coasts 
whatsoever, of our said provinces.‖127 Moreover, the ―ancient jurisdiction 
in admiralty‖ in England was broader before being curtailed by 
Parliament, and Justice Wayne noted the potential irony if this limitation 
could be changed in England by legislation while remaining fixed as 
constitutional doctrine in the United States.
128
 He argued that the Framers 
understood this history and intended broader admiralty jurisdiction in the 
United States than in England.
129
 
Waring reflected the larger constitutional debate regarding judicial 
power to construe general language in the Constitution, and whether it was 
limited to a fixed understanding of those words at the time of ratification, 
or free to construe the text in light of changed circumstances.
130
 In 
deciding the scope of admiralty jurisdiction the Court interpreted a few 
simple words in Article III,
131
 with little guidance as to their meaning.
132
 
Just as it had shed aspects of English law it felt no longer germane to the 
issue of title to submerged lands, the Court in Waring rejected the idea that 
 
 
 126. Waring, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 470 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).  
 127. Id. at 454 (referring to admiralty jurisdiction in new Hampshire and Georgia); see id. at 456–
67 (discussing broader reach of admiralty in Virginia, New York and Maryland); Conover, supra note 
125, at 35–36 (identifying expansive admiralty jurisdiction in the Colonies to deal with piracy, 
smuggling, and buccaneering). 
 128. Waring, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 455–58.  
 129. See id. at 454–61. 
 130. See id. at 457. 
 131. ―The judicial Power shall extend . . . to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction. . . .‖ 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 132. Hamilton devoted two sentences to admiralty jurisdiction in The Federalist, and the provision 
was ―virtually uncontested in Philadelphia and in the state ratifying conventions.‖ Note, supra note 37, 
at 1214; see also Conover, supra note 125, at 38–39 (describing paucity of debate over admiralty at 
Constitutional Convention). 
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the states should adopt English admiralty law except ―as applicable to their 
situation.‖133 Rather, the Court found that pre-existing English law was no 
longer germane: ―We therefore conclude, that the grant of admiralty power 
to the courts of the United States was not intended to be limited or to be 
interpreted by what were cases of admiralty jurisdiction in England when 
the constitution was adopted.‖134 
By severing ties to English legal roots, the Court was free to evaluate 
policy concerns relevant to governance of a new federal republic. Justice 
Wayne asserted that the exercise of separate admiralty jurisdiction, and 
therefore varying principles of admiralty law, by individual states under 
the Articles of Confederation created ―difficulties.‖135 A uniform, neutral 
judicial forum for adjudicating admiralty disputes had the same value 
whether or not the events that caused the dispute occurred on waters 
outside or within the borders of a state or county. That suggested, of 
course, that artificial geographic (as opposed to geopolitical) limitations 
on admiralty jurisdiction were also suspect. Justice Wayne hinted as 
much
136
 but did not base his ruling on the artificial distinction between 
navigability on salt water versus on fresh water. 
The Supreme Court‘s reluctance to depart from admiralty‘s 
geographical limits, as distinct from the geopolitical limits of state or 
country borders, is apparent from its initial efforts to minimize the 
apparently artificial tidewater distinction. In Peyroux v. Howard,
137
 the 
Court upheld admiralty jurisdiction at the Port of New Orleans on the 
Mississippi River, at a point at which tidal influence was not strong 
enough to turn back the current of the river (and hence to propel ships 
upstream absent another source of power), but was ―so great as to occasion 
a regular rise and fall of the water.‖138 The tentative nature of the Court‘s 
effort to shift admiralty inland was confirmed four years later when the 
Court rejected an exercise of admiralty jurisdiction over a voyage in which 
one terminus was in tidal waters but where the trip was ―substantially‖ on 
non-tidal waters.
139
 
 
 
 133. Waring, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 461. 
 134. Id. at 459. 
 135. Id. at 456–57; see Conover, supra note 125, at 37 (widely different admiralty courts among 
the 13 states under Articles of Confederation demonstrated need for national uniformity). 
 136. See Waring, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 463 (conclusions were ―more congenial with our 
geographical condition‖). 
 137. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324 (1833) 
 138. Id. at 343; see also Waring, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 466 (Catron, J., concurring) (preferring to 
ground decision on fact that collision occurred ―on fresh water slightly influenced by the pressure of 
tide from the ocean‖). 
 139. Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 175, 183 (1837).  
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Later Supreme Court opinions would virtually ridicule these line 
drawing efforts,
140
 which served only to extend admiralty a few hundred 
yards upriver. Eventually, in The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 
Chief Justice Taney proclaimed that the tidewater limitation on admiralty 
jurisdiction might have made sense in England or earlier in U.S. history, 
but that different geographic conditions coupled with changes in 
technology and commerce rendered that doctrine no longer appropriate.
141
 
The Propeller Genesee Chief was an in rem proceeding arising from a 
collision on the Great Lakes, to which Congress had extended admiralty 
jurisdiction by statute.
142
 In upholding the statute, Chief Justice Taney 
noted that there was no practical difference between the Great Lakes and 
the seas in terms of the reasons for admiralty jurisdiction.
143
 The Court 
could have stopped here, particularly given that the decision interpreted a 
federal statute that applied exclusively to the Great Lakes. But the Court‘s 
existing constitutional interpretation required tidal influence. Chief Justice 
Taney disposed of this distinction as artificial and irrelevant to the 
purposes served by admiralty courts: 
 Now there is certainly nothing in the ebb and flow of the tide 
that makes the waters peculiarly suitable for admiralty jurisdiction, 
nor any thing in the absence of a tide that renders it unfit. If it is a 
public navigable water, on which commerce is carried on between 
different States or nations, the reason for the jurisdiction is precisely 
the same. And if a distinction is made on that account, it is merely 
arbitrary, without any foundation in reason; and, indeed, would 
seem to be inconsistent with it.
144
 
 
 
 140.  
[A] line drawn across the river Mississippi would limit the jurisdiction, although there were 
ports of entry above it, and the water as deep and navigable, and the commerce as rich, and 
exposed to the same hazards and incidents, as the commerce below. The distinction would be 
purely artificial and arbitrary as well as unjust, and would . . . subject one part of a public 
river to the jurisdiction of a court of the United States, and deny it to another part equally 
public and but a few yards distant. 
Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457 (1851); see also Hine v. Trevor, 71 
U.S. (4 Wall.) 555, 566 (1866) (describing The Propeller Genesee Chief as ―having removed the 
imaginary line of tide-water which had been supposed to circumscribe the jurisdiction of the admiralty 
courts‖); Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 302 (1857) (―We could no longer 
evade the question by a judicial notice of an occult tide without ebb or flow, as in the case of Peyroux 
v. Howard.‖); United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 82 (1838) (noting the ―great practical 
difficulties in ascertaining the precise place‖ from which property is taken in cases of shipwrecks).  
 141. The Propeller Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 453–57. 
 142. Id. at 450–51.  
 143. Id. at 453–54. 
 144. Id. at 454 (emphasis added). 
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Chief Justice Taney reasoned that the public character of a navigable 
waterway—its use by the public for commerce and trade—made it suitable 
for admiralty jurisdiction. Although the accuracy of his historical and 
geographical analysis has been critiqued,
145
 Taney argued that tidal 
influence was merely a surrogate for public navigable waters because, in 
England, only tidal waters were navigable for purposes of significant 
commercial boating.
146
 The expanding United States, by contrast, had 
thousands of miles of ―public navigable water . . . in which there is no 
tide,‖147 the use of which ―has been growing stronger every day with the 
growing commerce on the lakes and navigable rivers of the western 
states.‖148 
In part, the increasing use of steamboats to transport people and goods 
in the early to mid-nineteenth century also supported the need to modify 
English admiralty law in the United States.
149
 Commercial traffic on inland 
waters was no longer constrained by the limits of tidal flow to carry 
vessels a short way upstream absent the wind power on which they 
otherwise relied. Based on these related factors, the Court later extended 
admiralty jurisdiction beyond the Great Lakes to other navigable inland 
waters,
150
 and ultimately to canals and other artificial waterways.
151
 
Chief Justice Taney‘s opinion in The Propeller Genesee Chief 
illustrates the degree to which U.S. courts inherited the English law of 
 
 
 145. See MacGrady, supra note 3, at 569–75. 
 146. The Propeller Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 455–56. 
 147. Id. at 457. 
 148. Id. at 451; see FITE & REESE, supra note 37. 
 149. See The Propeller Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 455 (noting that tidewater limitation 
made more sense until invention of the steamboat); see also The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555, 
562 (1866) (―But with the vast increase of inland navigation consequent upon the use of steamboats, 
and the development of wealth on the borders of the rivers, which thus became the great water 
highways of an immense commerce, the necessity for an admiralty court, and the value of admiralty 
principles in settling controversies growing out of this system of transportation, began to be felt.‖); 
Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 466 (1847) (Catron, J., concurring) (noting that waters only 
barely influenced by the tide could be navigated by steam-powered vessels). See generally LOUIS C. 
HUNTER, STEAMBOATS ON THE WESTERN RIVERS: AN ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL HISTORY 3–
60 (1949). Ironically, the collision at issue in The Propeller Genesee Chief was between a steamboat 
and a sailing vessel (a schooner). The steamboat Genesee Chief rammed and sunk the schooner Cuba, 
in perhaps an unfortunate metaphor for the replacement of sailing ships with steamers. See Wilkinson, 
supra note 37, at 1224. 
 150. Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296 (1857) (Alabama River); Fretz v. 
Bull, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 466 (1851) (Mississippi River). To reach this result, the Court needed to 
conclude that Congress did not intend, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, to limit admiralty jurisdiction to 
the inherited principles of English law. Jackson, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 300–01; see Conover, supra 
note 125, at 39.  
 151. Ex parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629 (1884). Artificial canals were arguably a second technological 
innovation that propelled the use of inland waterborne commerce. See generally GOODRICH ET AL., 
supra note 77. 
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navigability while still modifying it to fit new or different 
circumstances.
152
 One of Chief Justice Taney‘s insights was that the public 
nature of navigable waters rendered them suitable to uniform admiralty 
law. He focused on the ―public character of the river‖153 and more 
generally on the thousands of miles of ―public navigable water‖ in the 
country that were not tidal.
154
 A focus on public waters was frequent in 
English legal history, although navigability was clearly one aspect of what 
might render a waterway public, as well as fishing and other common 
uses.
155
 
The federalism implications of The Propeller Genesee Chief opinion 
are also ironic given that its author would write the Dred Scott decision 
just six years later.
156
 In the same year as Dred Scott, the Court extended 
its admiralty decision beyond the Great Lakes, upholding admiralty 
jurisdiction in the Alabama River, an intrastate river (except for its 
terminus in the Gulf of Mexico) in a southern state,
157
 over vehement 
dissents written by two southern Justices in defense of states‘ rights, and 
joined by a third.
158
 Why would a justice from the border state of 
Maryland,
159
 whose place in history is most closely associated with his 
efforts to protect states‘ rights in the context of slavery, write a pre-Civil 
War opinion that so dramatically expanded the limits of federal judicial 
power at the expense of state courts? After all, a key historical purpose of 
that limitation was to preserve the right to a jury trial before a local court 
against an overreaching central judicial authority (federal courts in the 
United States; in England, the royal admiralty courts).
160
 
 
 
 152. See also Jackson, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 307 (McLean, J., concurring) (―Antiquity has its 
charms, as it is rarely found in the common walks of professional life; but it may be doubted whether 
wisdom is not more frequently found in experience and the gradual progress of human affairs; and this 
is especially the case in all systems of jurisprudence which are matured by the progress of human 
knowledge. Whether it be common, chancery, or admiralty law, we should be more instructed by 
studying its present adaptations to human concerns, than to trace it back to its beginnings‖). 
 153. The Propeller Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 455 (emphasis added). 
 154. Id. at 457 (emphasis added). 
 155. See Hulsebosch, supra note 10, at 1072–74, 1082; Lauer, supra note 10, at 65–66, 70, 89–90, 
94–95, 105; Leighty, supra note 3, at 432. 
 156. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 157. Jackson, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 297–301. 
 158. Id. at 307–08 (Daniel, J., dissenting). Justice Daniel was from Virginia; Justice Catron, from 
Tennessee, joined the dissent of Justice Campbell, who was from Alabama. See TIMOTHY L. HALL, 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 99, 107, 127 (2001). 
 159. HALL, supra note 158, at 91. 
 160. See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text. The irony was that The Thomas Jefferson 
was decided by Justice Story, perhaps most famous for his decision in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 
1 (1842), which promoted a national law of commerce, and whose admiralty decisions in all other 
respects sought to expand federal judicial power. See Wilkinson, supra note 37, at 1214, 1217. For an 
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This apparent paradox can be explained by the same legal tension 
discussed above regarding the competing liberty interests in private versus 
public property in waterways, both of which are rooted deeply in English 
legal tradition. To the extent that the free use of public waters to transport 
people and goods in interstate and international commerce promotes 
economic liberty, Chief Justice Taney argued that access to the protections 
of an independent judicial forum is an essential safeguard of that right.
161
 
Moreover, he asserted that it was just as essential as a matter of states’ 
rights to provide equal access to protections of the admiralty courts to the 
western states as to the Atlantic coast states.
162
 Clearly, he believed that 
the legal protection afforded by admiralty courts supported commerce and 
that the scope of admiralty jurisdiction should not favor some states over 
others. Thus, Chief Justice Taney‘s opinion in The Propeller Genesee 
Chief was as deeply rooted in the equal footing doctrine, and in 
background principles of English law, as was Justice McKinley‘s decision 
in Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan.163 
In early cases delineating the scope of admiralty jurisdiction, the 
Court‘s decisions were unequivocal, based on historical practice inherited 
from England.
164
 Justice Story, however, hinted that Congress might 
achieve a similar result under the Commerce Clause: 
Whether, under the power to regulate commerce between the States, 
Congress may not extend the remedy by the summary process of the 
Admiralty, to the case of voyages on the western waters, it is 
unnecessary for us to consider. If the public inconvenience, from 
the want of a process of an analogous nature, shall be extensively 
felt, the attention of the Legislature will doubtless be drawn to the 
subject.
165
 
 
 
analysis of the political forces that seem to have compelled Justice Story to limit admiralty power in 
The Thomas Jefferson despite his otherwise strongly Federalist leanings, see id. at 1218–20.  
 161. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454 (1851). To this extent, 
admiralty jurisdiction serves a function similar to that of diversity jurisdiction.  
 162. Id. 
 163. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
 164. See The Steam-Boat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428, 429 (1825) (―This is the 
prescribed limit which it was not at liberty to transcend.‖); Hobart v. Drogan, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 108, 
119–20 (1836); Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 175, 183 (1837); United States v. 
Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 76 (1838); see also Wilkinson, supra note 37, at 1215 (noting that 
Justice Story‘s opinion in The Thomas Jefferson cited no cases, but was rooted ―in the precedent of 
history‖). 
 165. The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 430. 
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Indeed, a decade later Justice Story would uphold a federal anti-theft 
statute enforced through admiralty process based on Commerce Clause 
rather than Article III authority.
166
 And in an exercise of cross-branch 
fertilization that would not be accepted today, Justice Story drafted the 
1845 statute extending federal admiralty jurisdiction to the Great Lakes 
and their connecting waters, and justified that authority under the 
Commerce Clause.
167
 That law provided the basis on which Chief Justice 
Taney, in The Propeller Genesee Chief, would overrule Justice Story‘s 
decision in The Thomas Jefferson. 
In The Propeller Genesee Chief, Chief Justice Taney expressly denied 
that the jurisdictional statute could have been adopted pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause, because it included no substantive regulation of 
commerce.
168
 Instead, it simply purported to extend federal admiralty court 
jurisdiction to the Great Lakes and their connecting waters.
169
 In upholding 
the constitutionality of this statute, the Court either had to overrule its 
earlier interpretation of the phrase ―all cases of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction‖170 or hold that the relevance and meaning of the term could 
change with commercial circumstances and technological innovations. 
The Court chose the latter course, basing its decision on the nature and 
magnitude of commercial navigation on inland waters in 1851 compared 
to 1789 or 1825. 
These cases reflect a tension between Article III admiralty jurisdiction 
and Article I Commerce Clause authority to support the changing 
conditions of an expanding nation. Cases expanding admiralty in the 
United States relied as much on the concept of ―public waters‖ as opposed 
to navigability per se. As will be shown in the next section, however, 
admiralty jurisdiction is far more inherently linked to navigability than is 
Commerce Clause power.
171
  
 
 
 166. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72. 
 167. See Wilkinson, supra note 37, at 1222–26. 
 168. One author suggests that Justice Taney preferred to expand federal admiralty jurisdiction 
rather than enhance Commerce Clause authority, for fear that the latter would be used to regulate 
slavery. See Hulsebosch, supra note 10, at 1104–05. 
 169. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 451–52 (1851).  
 170. Id. at 460. 
 171. See Waite, supra note 119, at 580 (―[A]ll admiralty jurisdiction refers directly or indirectly to 
navigation.‖) (quoting United States v. Burlington & Henderson Cnty. Ferry Co., 21 F.331, 334 (S.D. 
Iowa 1884)). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1670 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1643 
 
 
 
 
C. Navigability and the Commerce Clause 
Navigability also influenced Federal Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 
Inland waterborne commerce grew steadily through English history and 
influenced the English law of riparian rights.
172
 Nevertheless, that 
commerce was constrained by technology. Because wind-powered sailing 
vessels were less viable on inland waterways, large commercial ships 
could only travel inland as far as they could be propelled by the tides. This 
changed dramatically with Robert Fulton‘s commercialization of the 
steamboat
173
 and its rapid expansion for commercial use on North 
American inland rivers.
174
 
In Gibbons v. Ogden,
175
 the Supreme Court invalidated, as inconsistent 
with plenary congressional power to regulate commerce, a New York law 
purporting to grant Fulton and Robert Livingston an exclusive license for 
navigation on state waters with boats powered by fire or steam.
176
 Chief 
Justice Marshall reasoned that ―power over commerce, including 
navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the people of 
America adopted their government,‖177 and that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause of the Constitution
178
 conferred on Congress the plenary authority 
necessary to execute that power.
179
 The Court was clearly influenced by 
the dominance of navigation as the primary means of conducting interstate 
and international commerce, through both the traditional maritime trade
180
 
and the growing commerce on inland waterways: ―The deep streams 
which penetrate our country in every direction, pass through the interior of 
almost every State in the Union, and furnish the means of exercising this 
 
 
 172. See Lauer, supra note 10, at 63–64 (modest use in Anglo-Saxon times), id. at 72–74 
(increasing uses of rivers and streams for navigation around the time of Magna Carta and throughout 
remaining medieval period), id. at 74 (by early seventeenth century ―navigation had become the 
mainstay of England‖), id. at 94 (late seventeenth and early eighteenth century cases ―disclose a 
continued recognition of the high public interest in navigation of rivers‖). 
 173. Fulton is commonly but wrongly credited with inventing the steamboat, but he did put the 
design into practice. See Mary Bells, The History of the Steamboat, John Fitch and Robert Fulton, 
ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/blsteamship.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2012); 
HUNTER, supra note 149, at 5–6 (explaining controversy over credit for steamboat development). 
 174. See The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 440–42 (1874); The Propeller Genesee Chief, 53 
U.S. (12 How.) at 455; Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 466 (1847) (Catron, J., concurring).  
 175. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 176. Id. at 1. 
 177. Id. at 190. 
 178. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 179. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 187–89. 
 180. Id. at 190 (addressing the importance of controlling maritime traffic through ports for 
purposes of regulating international commerce). 
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right [of all states to participate in international and interstate 
commerce].‖181 
The immediate issue in Gibbons was not an affirmative exercise of 
federal authority over interstate or foreign commerce, but whether a state 
law infringed on that plenary power. Cases following Gibbons affirmed 
direct federal power to construct improvements in aid of navigability
182
 
and to prohibit projects by others that would obstruct navigation.
183
 As 
was true with the law of navigability for title and the law of admiralty, the 
Court also faced related questions of federalism. Thus, the Court later 
upheld concurrent state authority to construct or authorize structures in or 
over navigable waters, so long as the exercise of that authority did not 
contravene federal law or regulation.
184
 Because these cases all relate 
directly to activities that would either improve or impede navigability, 
they hew closely to the rationale of Gibbons that navigability is one 
component of ―commerce.‖ 
The focus in Gibbons on the value of inland waterways for commerce 
led to the Court‘s later decision to expand the geographic reach of 
Commerce Clause coverage to all water bodies deemed navigable in 
fact.
185
 Indeed, the Court articulated the classic statement of the 
 
 
 181. Id. at 195. 
 182. See, e.g., Okla. ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941) (upholding 
federal dam as part of larger program to improve navigability); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 
U.S. 288 (1936) (upholding federal authority to build dam on Tennessee River to improve navigation, 
for national defense, and for power production); South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 4 (1876) 
(upholding federal authority to construct projects in aid of navigation on interstate river); Pennsylvania 
v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855) (upholding federal statute 
authorizing bridge over Ohio River and congressional determination that it did not obstruct 
commerce). 
 183. See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899) (upholding 
federal action to enjoin construction of dam that would reduce flows sufficiently to impede 
navigability of river downstream of dam). 
 184. See, e.g., Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 288 (upholding state approval of dam on navigable water 
so long as Congress had passed no law to the contrary); Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 
Wall.) 713 (1865) (holding that states retain sovereignty over their waters and therefore have authority 
to regulate bridges and other structures absent conflict with federal law); Willson v. Black Bird Creek 
Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (upholding state law authorizing dam construction where no 
conflict with federal authority). 
 185. The Court reached this result in a Commerce Clause case earlier than it did explicitly in a 
navigability for title case, see supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text, but two decades after it had 
done so for admiralty jurisdiction, see supra notes 136–44 and accompanying text. It seems apparent 
from the breadth of Chief Justice Taney‘s opinion in The Propeller Genesee Chief that the Court 
would have reached this result for Commerce Clause purposes at least as early as 1851 had the issue 
been raised squarely in that case. See 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 451 (1851) (―And the difficulties which 
the language and decisions of this court had thrown in the way, of extending it to these waters, have 
perhaps led to the inquiry whether the law in question could not be supported under the power granted 
to Congress to regulate commerce.‖). 
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navigability test in federal law in The Daniel Ball,
186
 a Commerce Clause 
case:
187
 
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law 
which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when 
they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary 
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel 
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel 
on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the United States 
within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction 
from the navigable waters of the States, when they form in their 
ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a 
continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on 
with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in 
which such commerce is conducted by water.
188
 
In support of this holding, the Court relied on the same geographic and 
historic realities that it had relied on in Gibbons and The Propeller 
Genesee Chief: U.S. waterways were navigable for hundreds of miles 
above tidewater and were increasingly relied on for significant amounts of 
commerce.
189
 Moreover, the very fact that The Daniel Ball involved a 
federal statute governing steamboat safety confirms that technological 
change factored into the Court‘s shifting navigability jurisprudence. 
Geographic delineations forged in the era of sailing vessels made little 
sense in the age of steam. In fact, the steamboat explanation may be a 
more satisfactory explanation for the inland expansion of the definition of 
navigable waters than any geographic differences between the United 
States and England. 
Over time, the Court expanded Commerce Clause jurisdiction based on 
navigability even further. In some cases, the Supreme Court broadened the 
test of what bodies of water were navigable for Commerce Clause 
 
 
 186. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870). 
 187. The Daniel Ball is sometimes mistakenly thought of as an admiralty case. See, e.g., David M. 
Guinn, An Analysis of the Navigable Waters of the United States, 18 BAYLOR L. REV. 559, 561 (1966). 
The case was brought in admiralty because the federal government enforced the federal regulatory 
statute governing inspection and licensing of steam vessels used for transport by seizing the vessel in 
question. The constitutional issue before the Court, however, was the scope of federal Commerce 
Clause authority regarding the transportation of goods on a vessel that remained intrastate but was part 
of an interstate chain of transport. Id. at 559, 564–65. 
 188. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563. 
 189. Id. 
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purposes.
190
 The Court continued to rely on historical evidence of 
commercial waterway use.
191
 But for Commerce Clause purposes the 
Court held that navigability could also rest on evolving uses and 
capabilities because the test for navigability is not limited, as it is in title 
cases, to whether the waterway was navigable at statehood. As stated in 
The Daniel Ball, the Commerce Clause test for navigability is whether 
waterways ―are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary 
condition,‖ as part of a highway of interstate commerce.192 The nature and 
magnitude of commerce sufficient to support a finding of navigability 
could vary widely based on location and economic context.
193
 
In other cases, the Court expanded the scope of Commerce Clause 
authority to encompass waters that were not themselves navigable, but the 
use, destruction, or impairment of which might impair navigability. Thus, 
in United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., the Court sustained federal 
authority to enjoin construction of a dam on a non-navigable reach of the 
Rio Grande where resulting upstream water withdrawals might impede 
navigability of the river downstream.
194
 This case also addressed related 
issues of federalism because the Court upheld federal Commerce Clause 
power vis-à-vis state (then territorial New Mexico)
195
 authority to allocate 
water rights pursuant to state (territorial) law.
196
 
 
 
 190. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (upholding federal authority over 
waterways susceptible to commercial use with improvements); Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United 
States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921) (upholding navigability even absent current use if susceptible of use for 
commerce in ordinary condition); The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874) (finding navigability 
despite obstructions that could be portaged by vessels of any kind that could be used to convey 
commerce). But see Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621 (1900) (use by small oyster boats and 
fishing craft insufficient; need commerce of permanent and sufficient character); United States v. Rio 
Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899) (occasional floating of logs and rafts not enough; 
water body ―must be generally and commonly useful to some purpose of trade or agriculture‖). 
 191. See Econ. Light & Power, 256 U.S. at 117 (relying in part on evidence of use to transport 
furs from the late 17th to the early 19th century); The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 440 (relying on 
evidence that Fox River was part of the route of Marquette and Joliet on voyage to discover the 
Mississippi River, and later became one of the main routes from the St. Lawrence to the Mississippi). 
 192. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563 (emphasis added); see also Econ. Light & Power, 
256 U.S. 113; Ashwander, 297 U.S. 288. 
 193. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 405–06 (1940) (―It is 
obvious that the uses to which the streams may be put vary from the carriage of ocean liners to the 
floating out of logs; that the density of traffic varies equally widely from the busy harbors of the 
seacoast to the sparsely settled regions of the Western mountains. The tests as to navigability must take 
these variations into consideration.‖). 
 194. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation, 174 U.S. at 706–08. 
 195. The Court assumed arguendo that territories also enjoyed the same power as states to modify 
the common law of water rights. See id. at 703. 
 196. Id. at 706 (―To hold that Congress, by these acts, meant to confer upon any State the right to 
appropriate all the waters of the tributary streams which unite into a navigable watercourse, and so 
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In United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.,
197
 the Court took 
even greater steps to shed the historical shackles of navigability in 
Commerce Clause cases. First, the Court held that navigability could be 
supported by economically justified artificial improvements.
198
 This result 
was by no means apparent from The Daniel Ball, which required not only 
that waters be ―susceptible of being used . . . as highways for commerce,‖ 
but that they be ―susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as 
highways for commerce.‖199 While this holding expanded the scope of 
waters subject to Commerce Clause power, it was still linked to 
navigability as the key value for which water bodies may be regulated and 
protected. Whether commerce occurs on a waterway that is navigable in its 
―ordinary condition‖ or as artificially improved, navigability remains the 
focus of the analysis. 
In the second key holding in Appalachian Electric Power Co., 
however, the Court upheld federal regulatory authority on non-navigable 
waters over dams that would affect the interest of interstate or 
international commerce.
200
 This decision was significantly different from 
its predecessors because the Supreme Court grounded its decision in part 
on the idea that navigability per se was just one way in which activities on 
waterways might have a sufficient effect on interstate or international 
commerce to justify Commerce Clause authority: 
In our view, it cannot properly be said that the constitutional power 
of the United States over its waters is limited to control for 
navigation. By navigation respondent means no more than operation 
of boats and improvement of the waterway itself. In truth the 
authority of the United States is the regulation of commerce on its 
waters. Navigability, in the sense just stated, is but a part of this 
whole. Flood protection, watershed development, recovery of the 
cost of improvements through utilization of power are likewise parts 
of commerce control. As respondent soundly argues, the United 
States cannot by calling a project of its own ―a multiple purpose 
dam‖ give to itself additional powers, but equally truly the 
respondent cannot, by seeking to use a navigable waterway for 
 
 
destroy the navigability of that watercourse in derogation of the interests of all the people of the United 
States, is a construction which cannot be tolerated.‖). 
 197. 311 U.S. 377. 
 198. Id. at 408 (―The power of Congress over commerce is not to be hampered because of the 
necessity for reasonable improvements to make an interstate waterway available for traffic.‖). 
 199. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870) (emphasis added). 
 200. Appalachian Elec. Power, 311 U.S. at 398, 400. 
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power generation alone, avoid the authority of the Government over 
the stream. That authority is as broad as the needs of commerce.
201
 
As such, the Court held that Congress did not exceed Commerce Clause 
authority when it regulated hydroelectric power production, as opposed to 
navigation itself.
202
 
The Court pursued this theme a year later in Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips 
v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., which sustained federal authority to build a dam 
on a non-navigable tributary where flood control benefits would improve 
navigability of the Mississippi River downstream.
203
 As was true in 
Appalachian Electric Power Co., the Court transcended navigability to 
justify federal authority to protect other values and functions of water 
bodies.
204
 The science of watershed management provided a new way to 
control floods, and the Court relied on the resulting impact on issues 
beyond navigability per se but still within Commerce Clause purview, 
although it still found a curious need to draw a link to navigability in some 
way:  
[T]here is no constitutional reason why Congress or the courts 
should be blind to the engineering prospects of protecting the 
nation‘s arteries of commerce through control of the watersheds. 
There is no constitutional reason why Congress cannot, under the 
commerce power, treat the watersheds as a key to flood control on 
navigable streams and their tributaries. Nor is there a constitutional 
necessity for viewing each reservoir project in isolation from a 
comprehensive plan covering the entire basin of a particular river. 
We need no survey to know that the Mississippi is a navigable river. 
We need no survey to know that the tributaries are generous 
contributors to the floods of the Mississippi. And it is common 
knowledge that Mississippi floods have paralyzed commerce in the 
affected areas and have impaired navigation itself.
205
 
As noted by then Associate Justice Rehnquist in Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States,
206
 these cases jettisoned the fiction of navigability when federal 
 
 
 201. Id. at 426. 
 202. Id. (―Water power development from dams in navigable streams is from the public‘s 
standpoint a by-product of the general use of the rivers for commerce.‖). 
 203. Okla. ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 523 (1941) (―And it is clear that 
Congress may exercise its control over the non-navigable stretches of a river in order to preserve or 
promote commerce on the navigable portions.‖); see id. at 525–26. 
 204. Id. at 525. 
 205. Id. 
 206. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
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authority is justified by another impact on interstate or international 
commerce: ―Reference to the navigability of a waterway adds little if 
anything to the breadth of Congress‘ regulatory power over interstate 
commerce.‖207 The Court had come full circle. Despite its reliance on 
maritime and inland navigation, in Gibbons the Supreme Court did not 
rule that navigation was commerce; it held only that navigation was part 
of commerce.
208
 Thus, navigability was one of many grounds for the 
exercise of Commerce Clause authority, even with respect to commercial 
activities conducted on navigable waters. 
D. The Federal Navigational Servitude 
Navigability is intuitively relevant in defining the geographic scope of 
a doctrine the Supreme Court has variously labeled a ―superior navigation 
easement,‖209 a ―dominant public interest in navigation,‖210 or a ―servitude 
in respect of navigation.‖211 Commentators refer to this doctrine as the 
―navigational servitude‖ or the ―navigation servitude.‖212 If this doctrine 
supports the federal government‘s interest in navigation, logically it 
should not extend beyond ―navigable‖ water bodies. Although the Court 
might amend the navigability test to reflect changing circumstances, the 
continuing relevance of navigability should never be in doubt. This 
seemingly irrefutable conclusion, however, is complicated by confusion 
surrounding the federal navigation servitude‘s historical origins, legal 
underpinnings, scope, and relationship to other constitutional doctrines, in 
 
 
 207. Id. at 173. 
 208. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) (―The power of Congress, then, 
comprehends navigation, within the limits of every State in the Union; so far as that navigation may 
be, in any manner, connected with ‗commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or 
with the Indian tribes.‘‖). 
 209. United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 231 (1960); United States v. Twin 
City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 225 (1956) (quoting United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 
725, 736 (1950)). 
 210. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 507 (1945); see also Ashwander v. 
Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 337 (1936) (referring to the ―dominant authority of the Federal 
Government in the interest of navigation‖). 
 211. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 156–57 (1900); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 
271–72 (1897); see also United States v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950) (referring 
both to a ―servitude‖ deriving from federal power to regulate commerce on navigable streams and a 
―dominant public interest‖). 
 212. See Theresa D. Taylor, Note, Determining the Parameters of the Navigation Servitude 
Doctrine, 34 VAND. L. REV. 461 (1981); Martha Goodloe Haber, Note, The Navigational Servitude 
and the Fifth Amendment, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1505 (1979–1980); Richard W. Bartke, The Navigation 
Servitude and Just Compensation—Struggle for a Doctrine, 48 OR. LAW REV. 1, 3 (1968). For 
simplicity I will use that language here, but in the end, the label itself may pose the definitional 
problem. 
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particular the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.
213
 That confusion 
can only be clarified by evaluating the relationship between the 
navigational servitude and the Commerce Clause and title doctrines. 
The first Supreme Court opinion based expressly on the navigational 
servitude, Gibson v. United States, was not issued until 1897,
214
 although it 
had antecedents in the Court‘s Commerce Clause cases.215 Facially, the 
Supreme Court grounds the navigational servitude in the federal 
government‘s plenary authority over interstate commerce.216 The 
―servitude‖ and ―easement‖ terminology, however, suggest a federal 
proprietary interest in navigable waters, and in some cases the Court has 
added that, for Commerce Clause purposes, navigable waters ―are the 
public property of the nation.‖217 Further, in United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co., the Court described any private title to the beds 
of navigable waters as a ―technical title,‖ which is ―qualified‖ and 
―subordinate to the public rights of navigation, and however helpful in 
protecting the owner against the acts of third parties, is of no avail against 
the exercise of the great and absolute power of Congress over the 
improvement of navigable rivers.‖218 In United States v. Twin City Power 
Co., Justice Douglas (writing for a five-Justice majority) attempted to 
clarify the inconsistency as follows:  
The interest of the United States in the flow of a navigable stream 
originates in the Commerce Clause. That Clause speaks in terms of 
power, not of property. But the power is a dominant one which can 
be asserted to the exclusion of any competing or conflicting one. 
The power is a privilege which we have called ―a dominant 
servitude,‖ or ―a superior navigation easement.‖219 
Some commentators, however, argue that the servitude is in fact more 
properly based in proprietary interests than in Commerce Clause authority, 
 
 
 213. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Because the servitude governs the relationship between property 
rights and federal Commerce Clause authority, the Fourteenth Amendment is not relevant. 
 214. Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897). 
 215. See, e.g., Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893); South 
Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 4 (1876); United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72 (1838); 
Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 
(1824). 
 216. See United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 627–28 (1961); United States v. 
Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 231 (1960); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 
222, 224 (1956). 
 217. Gilman, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 724–25; see also United States v. Rand, 389 U.S. 121, 123 
(1967). 
 218. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62–63 (1913). 
 219. Twin City Power, 350 U.S. at 224–25 (citations omitted). 
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or in both, and therefore that the ―interest should be recognized for what it 
is and be dealt with in the context of the property clause of the 
Constitution.‖220 Characterizing the navigation servitude as adjunct to 
Commerce Clause authority or as a proprietary interest, respectively, has 
significant implications for the relevance of the navigability test to 
delineate the scope of the doctrine. 
Once the Court announced in Gibbons that the ―power of Congress . . . 
comprehends navigation, within the limits of every State in the Union, so 
far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with‖ interstate or 
foreign commerce,
221
 the door was opened for several different 
manifestations of that power. For example, Congress could pass laws 
determining whether bridges or other structures may permissibly obstruct 
navigable waters for other legitimate purposes;
222
 requiring inspection, 
licensing and regulation of steamboats on navigable waters;
223
 taking 
affirmative steps to improve navigability of rivers and other waters, 
including channelization projects, lighthouses, jetties, etc.;
224
 prohibiting 
or regulating actions by others deemed to impede navigation and 
commerce;
225
 and authorizing construction or regulation of dams and 
related structures to improve navigation, among other objectives.
226
 
None of the above examples, however, require a separate doctrine 
known as the ―navigational servitude.‖ Federal action can be judged based 
on its connection to interstate commerce for any of the reasons found 
acceptable by the Supreme Court.
227
 A navigability test delineates what 
federal actions fall within the navigable waters subcategory of Commerce 
Clause regulation, but it does not limit Commerce Clause authority to that 
subcategory, even for water that affects interstate commerce in some other 
 
 
 220. Bartke, supra note 212, at 2; see also Leighty, supra note 3, at 430 (agreeing with Bartke). 
 221. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824). 
 222. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1857). 
 223. The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 
(1870). 
 224. United States v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941); Willink v. 
United States, 240 U.S. 572 (1916); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900); South Carolina v. 
Georgia, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 4, 11–12 (1876).  
 225. Sanitary Dist. Chi. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925); Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United 
States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907); United States v. 
Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899). 
 226. Okla. ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941); United States v. 
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 
(1936). 
 227. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (acknowledging Commerce Clause 
authority over channels of interstate commerce, instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and activities 
with substantial relationship to interstate commerce).  
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way.
228
 After the Supreme Court‘s decision in Appalachian Electric Power 
Co.,
229
 federal actions on non-navigable tributaries or other waters, the use 
or impairment of which might affect navigation or other components of 
interstate commerce, also met Commerce Clause scrutiny. 
In reality, the federal navigational servitude arose not simply as a 
species of Commerce Clause authority, but to address cases in which 
exercise of that authority may conflict with private property. In three cases 
predating Gibson, the Supreme Court upheld compensation or prohibited a 
taking for projects to improve navigable waters.
230
 ―Congress has supreme 
control over the regulation of commerce, but if, in exercising that supreme 
control, it deems it necessary to take private property, then it must proceed 
subject to the limitations imposed by [the] Fifth Amendment, and can take 
only on payment of just compensation.‖231 
In Gibson, however, the Court declined to require compensation for 
incidental damages to river access caused by a dike designed to improve 
navigation, holding that such a property right ―is always subject to the 
servitude in respect of navigation created in favor of the federal 
government by the constitution.‖232 A series of later cases—the 
consistency of which has been questioned in ways not relevant to the 
thesis of this Article
233—upheld federal authority against takings claims 
with respect to navigational projects, including a pier that blocked a 
landowner‘s existing stream access;234 projects that reduced water power 
benefits on navigable rivers;
235
 dredging that destroyed oyster beds;
236
 
river widening that increased value of remaining portions of condemned 
 
 
 228. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Neb. ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (upholding Commerce 
Clause challenge to state statute because water is an instrumentality of interstate commerce). 
 229. Appalachian Elec. Power, 311 U.S. 377; see supra notes 193–98 and accompanying text. 
 230. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893) (overturning 
compensation award for failure to include value of franchise to collect tolls from private lock and dam 
condemned by federal government); Miss. & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. (8 Otto.) 403 
(1878) (upholding condemnation award on behalf of private company operating with federal 
government authority due to location value of islands for navigational booms); Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 
U.S. (10 Wall.) 497 (1870) (invalidating city order to remove private dock where no showing of 
impairment to navigation). 
 231. Monongahela Navigation, 148 U.S. at 336. 
 232. Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 271, 272 (1897).  
 233. See supra note 208. 
 234. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900).  
 235. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v. Willow River 
Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 
(1913). But see United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (compensation awarded when loss of 
water power is along tributary streams). 
 236. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913). 
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lands;
237
 a project that damaged structures on riparian lands below high 
water mark;
238
 dredging that destroyed the navigability of one water to 
improve navigation in another, to the detriment of residential 
landowners;
239
 and a project and associated condemnation without 
compensation for port site value.
240
 
It is difficult to explain these decisions on Commerce Clause grounds 
alone.
241
 Clearly, the holdings cannot be explained absent federal authority 
to construct navigation projects or to enact the regulatory schemes in 
question. But no other federal Commerce Clause actions are simply 
immune from Fifth Amendment takings protections.
242
 In part, the Court 
has distinguished situations in which federal action invades fast land, 
which require compensation, from those in which federal activities impair 
riparian rights below the high water mark of the navigable waterway.
243
 
But physical invasion is only one basis for a takings claim, and the fact 
that it may be more difficult to prove a claim under other branches of the 
Court‘s takings analysis244 is different from eliminating the possibility 
altogether. Similarly, although it may be more difficult to prove a 
compensable taking for impairment of a location value or other rights 
short of full fee title, the Court has entertained takings claims in analogous 
situations, such as impairment of air rights.
245
 Clearly, from relatively 
early on in U.S. constitutional history, the Supreme Court has viewed 
navigability as a particularly important public value, perhaps logically 
connected to its historic relationship to national defense and foreign 
affairs. 
The geographic scope of the federal navigational servitude, therefore, 
is particularly important to its relationship to the Fifth Amendment. But 
 
 
 237. United States v. Rouge River Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926). 
 238. United States v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941). 
 239. United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945). 
 240. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967). 
 241. Professor Bartke made this point more than fifty years ago, arguing that the Property Clause 
would be more appropriate to this doctrine than the Commerce Clause. Bartke, supra note 212. 
 242. See Haber, supra note 212. 
 243. See, e.g., United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 628 (1961) (―Since the 
privilege or servitude only encompasses the exercise of this federal power with respect to the stream 
itself and the lands beneath and within its high-water mark, the Government must compensate for any 
taking of fast lands which results from the exercise of the power.‖); United States v. Kan. City Life 
Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 807–08 (1950) (compensation for damage to land outside but not within bed of 
river, where higher river level saturated groundwater and thereby destroyed farming capacity of land). 
 244. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (requiring 
compensation even absent physical taking where regulations ―not reasonably necessary to the 
effectuation of a substantial public purpose‖). 
 245. See Haber, supra note 212, at 1512 (discussing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) 
(damage caused by overflights)); Griggs v. Allegheny Cnty., 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (same)). 
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the doctrine did not even exist when the Supreme Court established the 
foundation for all of the federal navigability tests in The Daniel Ball.
246
 
Thus, given its Commerce Clause roots, from the outset the navigational 
servitude applied at least to all waters deemed ―navigable in fact.‖247 After 
the Court expanded the scope of Commerce Clause regulatory authority in 
Appalachian Electric Power Co., however, the logical question was 
whether the same scope would apply to navigational servitude cases as to 
other Commerce Clause cases based on impacts to navigable waters? 
In United States v. Twin City Power Co.,
248
 the Court held that 
furtherance of other project purposes does not prevent assertion of the 
servitude so long as ―the interests of navigation are served‖ in some 
way,
249
 as was true in upholding federal regulatory authority for 
multipurpose projects in Appalachian Electric Power Co. Similarly, in 
United States v. Grand River Dam Authority,
250
 the Court rejected a 
takings claim regarding a comprehensive navigation, flood control, and 
power project to protect the navigability of the Arkansas River 
downstream,
251
 as was true for the Red River and Mississippi River in 
Oklahoma ex rel Phillips.
252
 Thus, although labeled with navigability 
nomenclature, the doctrine could be used to vindicate the broader range of 
public uses and values in water bodies subject to Commerce Clause 
powers. 
The Supreme Court tempered this jurisdictional expansion of the 
navigational servitude in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
253
 in which Justice 
Rehnquist ruled that navigability is not as extensive for the navigational 
servitude as it is for other Commerce Clause purposes.
254
 Justice 
Rehnquist reaffirmed the ruling in Appalachian Electric Power Co. that 
―navigability . . . adds little if anything to the breadth of Congress‘ 
regulatory power over interstate commerce.‖255 By contrast, he found that 
the navigational servitude is more narrowly confined as ―an expression of 
the notion that the determination whether a taking has occurred must take 
 
 
 246. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870). 
 247. In some cases, the Court curtailed federal authority to regulate navigation projects as beyond 
the scope of traditional navigable waters. See, e.g., United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); Leovy 
v. United States, 177 U.S. 621 (1900). 
 248. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956). 
 249. Id. at 224. 
 250. United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960). 
 251. Id. at 231–32. 
 252. See supra notes 203–05 and accompanying text. 
 253. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).  
 254. Id. at 170–74. 
 255. Id. at 173. 
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into consideration the important public interest in the flow of interstate 
waters that in their natural condition are in fact capable of supporting 
public navigation.‖256 Under this view, federal authority under the 
servitude is limited to the navigational subset of Commerce Clause 
powers, presumably under the Daniel Ball test,
257
 whereas under the 
broader view suggested by Twin City Power and Grand River Dam it 
would not necessarily be so constrained. 
III. THE ROLE OF NAVIGABILITY IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Part II explained how the Supreme Court, over time, shifted its 
approach to each of the four main doctrines of constitutional law for which 
navigability serves a jurisdictional function. Following the lead of state 
courts, the Court first affirmed that public ownership and control of some 
waters had deep historical roots, but more important, that public 
ownership of waterways is essential to protection of economic liberty. The 
Court began with sovereign dominion over the high seas and waters 
affected by the tides, but quickly recognized that, in North America, the 
public interest applied to a vast network of inland waters as well. It 
followed suit first for purposes of federal admiralty jurisdiction and later 
for the Commerce Clause and its corollary in the federal navigational 
servitude. At least with respect to the Commerce Clause, the Court 
eventually returned to navigability as just one of the many important 
public purposes served by rivers and other bodies of water. 
Perhaps most notable about this history is the degree to which the 
Supreme Court has been willing to modify its concept and use of 
navigability based on changing circumstances: 
Antiquity has its charms, as it is rarely found in the common walks 
of professional life; but it may be doubted whether wisdom is not 
more frequently found in experience and the gradual progress of 
human affairs; and this is especially the case in all systems of 
jurisprudence which are matured by the progress of human 
knowledge. Whether it be common, chancery, or admiralty law, we 
 
 
 256. Id. at 175. 
 257. See also United States v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950) (―It is not the 
broad constitutional power to regulate commerce, but rather the servitude derived from that power and 
narrower in scope, that frees the Government from liability in these cases.‖). 
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should be more instructed by studying its present adaptations to 
human concerns, than to trace it back to its beginnings.
258
 
Throughout the evolution of the law of navigability, the Court has 
expressed similar views about the need for courts to modify doctrine, even 
in ways that shift the balance between what the law recognizes as public or 
private, to reflect new technologies, new knowledge and understanding, or 
changed circumstances.
259
 Likewise, commentators have praised the 
Court‘s awareness of the degree to which changing conditions shape the 
law of navigability. Referring to the Court‘s landmark decision in The 
Propeller Genesee Chief, Professor Conover wrote: 
 Thus did a half century of dispute culminate in a realistic 
decision that liberated American water commerce from an arbitrary 
restriction. The case is not only a milestone in our constitutional 
history, but . . . a bright page in our jurisprudence in that it 
demonstrates the ability of the law to adjust to political and 
economic growth.
260
 
The question now is the degree to which changing uses and values of 
waterways should similarly dictate new judicial approaches in the twenty-
first century. At least two significant shifts in our use and understanding of 
waterways should inform this issue, and although neither is entirely 
―new,‖ sometimes it takes time for the law to catch up to such changes.261 
First, the waterborne commerce that drove development of the law of 
navigability in the nineteenth century no longer predominates as the most 
significant channel of interstate commerce.
262
 Second, a wide range of 
other public uses and values now significantly eclipse transportation as the 
 
 
 258. Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 307 (1857) (McLean, J., 
concurring). 
 259. See, e.g., Okla. ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 525–26 (1941) 
(approval of Commerce Clause power based on new understanding of engineering and flood control); 
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407–08, 426 (1940) (expansion of 
Commerce Clause power in light of new circumstances and commercial goals); The Propeller Genesee 
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 451–54 (1851) (expanding admiralty jurisdiction in light of 
geographic realities and new technology); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 228–29 (1845) 
(rejecting continued applicability of English law where no longer applicable to American 
circumstances); Martin v. Waddell‘s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410–11 (1842) (same). 
 260. Conover, supra note 125, at 53; see also Lauer, supra note 10, at 99 (praising similar ability 
of English courts to modify riparian law in early nineteenth century). 
 261. See Wilkinson, supra note 37, at 1217–18 (noting that the dramatic increase in steamboat 
traffic in western rivers had begun before Justice Story decided The Steam-Boat Thomas Jefferson, and 
that it took the Court a quarter of a century to realize the import of those changes in The Propeller 
Genesee Chief). 
 262. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). 
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predominant justifications for public ownership or control of waterways. 
This Part first addresses these two major changes in our understanding and 
use of waterways, and then evaluates the significance of those changes for 
the constitutional doctrines explored above. 
A. The Changing Face of U.S. Waters 
1. The Declining Importance of Inland Waters as a Mode of 
Transportation 
The early cases in which the Supreme Court invoked the growing 
importance of transportation and commerce on U.S. inland waterways to 
support significant shifts in the law of navigability
263
 predated the era of 
―Brandeis briefs‖ in which the Court routinely began to cite scientific and 
other data in its opinions.
264
 Nevertheless, the Court was hardly engaged in 
fits of romantic speculation. In addition to North America‘s geographic 
advantage in having such an extensive network of natural navigable inland 
waterways, such as the Ohio, Mississippi, and Missouri Rivers, as well as 
the Great Lakes and their connecting waters, two significant technological 
advances helped to support the use and importance of those natural waters: 
the steamboat and the construction of canals and other artificial 
improvements to navigation. 
As suggested above, commercialization of the steamboat and the 
dramatic expansion of its use on western rivers was a major stimulus of 
western exploration and expansion.
265
 Lewis and Clark navigated the 
upper Missouri River in primitive dugout canoes at the outset of the 
nineteenth century,
266
 but less than twenty years later the 250-ton 
steamboat Thomas Jefferson, on the journey that gave rise to the case 
bearing its name,
267
 carried supplies up the same river to support the 
Army‘s Yellowstone expedition.268 In the words of one historian: 
 
 
 263. See, e.g., The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555, 562 (1866); The Propeller Genesee 
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 451, 453–54 (1851). 
 264. See ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON & RITA J. SIMON, THE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA IN 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (1998); Robert W. Adler, The Supreme Court and Ecosystems: 
Environmental Science in Environmental Law, 27 VT. L. REV. 249, 343–46 (2003).  
 265. See supra notes 145–47, 168–69 and accompanying text.  
 266. See AMBROSE, supra note 21. 
 267. The Steam-Boat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825). The coincidence is 
appropriate given President Jefferson‘s role in commissioning the Lewis and Clark expedition. 
 268. See Wilkinson, supra note 37, at 1215. 
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In the development of the greater part of the vast Mississippi basin 
from a raw frontier society to economic and social maturity the 
steamboat was the principal technological agent. During the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century the wheels of commerce in this 
extensive region were almost literally paddle wheels.
269
 
Among the many reasons for this dominance, overland roads at the time 
were poor and travel on them slow,
270
 but steamboats could travel both up 
and down rivers to an extent not possible for sailing vessels,
271
 and could 
do so far more quickly than other modes of transportation.
272
 Moreover, 
steamboats dramatically reduced the costs of freight transportation.
273
 
The utility of the steamboat was augmented by the era of canals. Even 
before the Revolutionary War, George Washington promoted canal 
transportation as a means of penetrating the interior of the continent, and 
publicly funded or supported canals helped to drive economic growth and 
inland expansion throughout much of the nineteenth century.
274
 Americans 
built approximately 4,000 miles of canals between 1815 and 1890, and one 
historian wrote that the resulting reduction in shipping costs
275
 ―was 
decisive for the opening of substantial trade between the east and west.‖276 
As a result, river transportation dominated the expanding western 
economy through the first half of the nineteenth century.
277
 By the time 
Chief Justice Taney was writing his pivotal opinion in The Propeller 
Genesee Chief in 1851, however, railroads had already drawn even with 
canals as highways of commerce, and many canals were soon 
abandoned.
278
 Just as waterways initially enjoyed early advantages over 
the nation‘s nascent road system, railroads were less challenged by 
topography, weather, and other factors, and soon became cheaper, more 
reliable, and even faster than steamboats in transporting goods and 
supplies to and from markets.
279
 By 1860, railroads had already taken over 
 
 
 269. HUNTER, supra note 149, at 3, see also id. at 21 (the steamboat was ―the beginning of a 
commercial revolution‖ and caused ―the economic emancipation of the western country‖). 
 270. See id. at 4. 
 271. See id. at 4–5. 
 272. See id. at 23–25. 
 273. See id. at 25–27. 
 274. See Dempsey, supra note 77, at 245–46. 
 275. For example, the average overland rate of freight shipping between Buffalo and New York in 
1817 was over 19 cents per mile, compared to 1.68 cents per mile after completion of the Erie Canal, a 
drop of more than 91 percent. GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 77, at 227–28. 
 276. Id. at 249. 
 277. See FITE & REESE, supra note 37, at 63–64, 188–91. 
 278. See Dempsey, supra note 77, at 246. 
 279. See id. 
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as ―the most important single form of transportation in the country.‖280 By 
the early twentieth century, many waterways were less amenable to water 
transportation than they had been in earlier times, when forested 
watersheds distributed water flows to rivers more evenly throughout the 
year,
281
 and in the first decade of the new century railroads exceeded 
waterborne traffic in tons of freight by a factor of ten.
282
 
To be sure, inland barges and other waterborne transportation remain 
significant economically and logistically,
283
 particularly in certain 
regions
284
 and for certain products.
285
 Although still critically important to 
the U.S. economy in many ways,
286
 water-based transportation is now 
responsible for a relatively small proportion of total commodities carried 
and, after a long period of decline, has remained level in recent decades.
287
 
Thus, although clearly still highly relevant for Commerce Clause and other 
constitutional purposes, water transportation is no longer the dominant use 
of U.S. waters that it was at the time of The Propeller Genesee Chief or 
The Daniel Ball. As shown below, transportation is now one of many 
significant uses for which water bodies are used and valued extensively in 
the United States.  
2. Use and Value of Waters for Ecological, Recreational, and Other 
Purposes 
The inherent ecological value provided by rivers has not changed 
dramatically in the past two and a half centuries. Our scientific 
 
 
 280. FITE & REESE, supra note 37, at 195. See also HUNTER, supra note 149, at 481, 484–88. 
 281. 1 EMORY RICHARD JOHNSON ET AL., HISTORY OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN COMMERCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES 13 (1915). 
 282. See id. at 194 (over a billion tons by rail versus just over 100 million by water). 
 283. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 284. The main stem of the Mississippi River system dominates modern inland waterborne 
transportation in the United States, and was responsible for more than 70 percent of all goods shipped 
on inland waterways in 2001. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 38, at iii. The other 
dominant portions of the system geographically are the Ohio River Basin and the Gulf Intercoastal 
Waterway. See id. at iii–iv. 
 285. See id. at ii (noting high value for petroleum and petroleum products). 
 286. KIM VACHAL ET AL., U.S. WATERWAYS, A BARGE SECTOR INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
ANALYSIS 4 (2005) (some U.S. shippers rely heavily on efficient waterborne freight to remain 
competitive); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, The Story of Water Transportation, Modern 
Transportation on Ancient Highways Level 2, USACE EDUCATION, available at http://education.usace 
.army.mil/navigation/lessons/2/navhisls2lv2.html (last visited June 15, 2013) (continued reliance on 
ports and inland waterways, particularly for international trade and industries that use or produce large, 
heavy or bulk materials). 
 287. See VACHAL ET AL., supra note 286, at 4 (total freight moved by water declined since 1980 to 
16.5% of total U.S. freight in 2001); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 38, at 19 (domestic 
water transportation stagnant over 20 years, despite higher foreign traffic). 
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understanding and societal appreciation of those values, however, has 
increased dramatically, as has our use of waterways for common purposes 
that extend well beyond transportation of people and goods. Those uses 
and values include water supply, fish and wildlife support habitat, 
recreation, and flood control and watershed protection. Because these uses 
and values have been catalogued extensively elsewhere,
288
 a brief review 
should suffice to demonstrate that a solitary focus on navigability to define 
what rivers are ―public‖ is unduly narrow, and the issues discussed below 
are not intended to comprise a complete list of those uses and values. On 
the other hand, the breadth of water bodies that exhibit these 
characteristics suggests that the concept of ―public waters‖ may need to 
reflect each of these uses in context, that is, that any associated public 
rights should be proportionate to the public values to be protected.  
Most obvious, rivers and other surface water systems provide water 
supply to a growing U.S. population. According to the most recent U.S. 
Geological Survey estimates, surface waters supply approximately eighty 
percent of U.S. withdrawals for domestic water supply, industrial use, 
irrigation, and power plant cooling.
289
 Although water conflicts were the 
source of some litigation in the early nineteenth century, giving rise to the 
reasonable use doctrine of riparian rights,
290
 water supply in the water-rich 
eastern states was abundant relative to demand. That would change as 
settlers moved to the arid western states, leading eventually to the 
adoption of the prior appropriation doctrine in the West.
291
 Both doctrines, 
however, consider the water in rivers (as opposed to the beds and banks 
and other property rights) to be owned by the public subject to usufructory 
rights by others.
292
 
In the twenty-first century, water resources are becoming increasingly 
scarce in both eastern and western states, a condition that is likely to be 
exacerbated by climate change.
293
 That scarcity, in turn, will have 
increasingly significant national and international economic and political 
impacts
294
 that further underscore the highly public nature of rivers and 
other bodies of surface water for purposes other than transportation. Of 
course, because even the smallest headwater streams can support public 
 
 
 288. See, e.g., supra notes 38–40. 
 289. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 40, at 4. 
 290. See Lauer, supra note 10, at 60–63; Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (D.R.I. 1827). 
 291. See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (Colo. 1882). 
 292. See Trelease, supra note 84. 
 293. See Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony of State Water Law, 29 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 13–17 (2010). 
 294. See id. at 33–51. 
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water supply, either directly or by recharging larger streams downstream, 
this factor suggests that all streams, however small, are ―public streams‖ 
for that purpose. The Supreme Court has recognized the significant value 
of rivers for purposes of public water supply,
295
 and acknowledged that 
―there are benefits from a great river that might escape a lawyer‘s 
view,‖296 in the context of Commerce Clause and other constitutional 
challenges to a state‘s right to protect its water from interstate diversions. 
Rivers and their associated ecosystems also provide an important 
habitat for fish and wildlife in ways that similarly have gone unrecognized 
due to the Court‘s focus on navigability in defining public waters. For 
example, one of the many uses of waterways in early American history 
was to transport massive quantities of fur trapped from western rivers.
297
 
In its navigability cases, the Supreme Court‘s rulings relied on the utility 
of waterways to transport fur and other commodities from west to east,
298
 
but the fact that rivers and their headwaters provided essential habitat for 
the fur-bearing mammals that sustained that trade was not similarly noted 
as a justification for public ownership or regulatory control of those public 
resources. On the other hand, the Court did recognize fishery values in 
public trust lands submerged by tidal waters
299
 and has identified,
300
 but 
not expressly protected, those values in navigable inland waters. 
The fish, wildlife, and other biodiversity benefits provided by rivers are 
now much better understood. Freshwater biodiversity in North America 
has declined significantly as a result of a wide range of factors, but rivers, 
lakes, and wetlands continue to support a significant number of fish, 
crayfish, freshwater mussels, and other species.
301
 The global value of 
freshwater fisheries was estimated at more than $8 billion per year from 
1989–1991.302 The economic value of freshwater aquatic biodiversity is 
difficult to measure because it is not ―traded‖ in traditional markets, but 
where water markets in the West have developed to purchase stream flow 
rights to support habitat values, the prices paid have been significant.
303
 
 
 
 295. Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908). 
 296. Id. at 357. 
 297. See generally ERIC JAY DOLIN, FUR, FORTUNE, AND EMPIRE: THE EPIC HISTORY OF THE FUR 
TRADE IN AMERICA 6 (2010). 
 298. See The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 440 (1874) (relying on navigability for fur trade). 
 299. See McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 391, 395 (1876); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 71, 74–75 (1855). 
 300. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). 
 301. See ABELL ET AL., supra note 41, at 25–58; Ciruna & Braun, supra note 41, at 23–35. 
 302. See Postel & Carpenter, supra note 40, at 198. 
 303. See id. at 204–06. 
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As the United States has shifted from a predominantly rural, agrarian 
population to an urban and industrial society, the demand for outdoor 
recreation, including recreation in and on waterways, has grown 
proportionately. For example, 31 million anglers in the United States 
fished an average of 14 days a year in 1991, with estimated direct 
expenditures of about $16 billion on equipment, travel costs, etc., and 
estimated total economic benefits of approximately $46 billion.
304
 
Waterfowl hunting also generates significant economic activity in the 
United States.
305
 Other freshwater recreational activities include 
swimming and boating, the full economic value of which can be difficult 
to estimate, especially when those activities occur on public waters for 
which no fee is charged.
306
 
Rivers and their associated watersheds—particularly when relatively 
unimpaired—also provide a wide range of hydrological benefits, including 
flood control, water pollution control, water supply through surface and 
groundwater recharge, and support of riparian vegetation and associated 
fish and wildlife habitat.
307
 The Supreme Court recognized these 
hydrological values to some degree in cases such as United States v. 
Appalachian Electric Power Co.,
308
 but mainly in the context of 
navigability, the principal constitutional lens through which the Court had 
historically viewed rivers and other water bodies. 
B. Implications for the Law of Navigability 
Inland waterways in the United States, while pivotal to transportation 
and commerce during the nation‘s first century, boast a much wider range 
of public uses and values that have substantially transcended navigability 
alone in the following century and a half. Those uses and values should be 
considered in light of the reasons for the navigability doctrine addressed in 
Part II. That analysis showed that, although navigation has been the most 
frequently invoked use for which ―public rivers‖ have been protected 
throughout Anglo-American legal history, it is just one of the public uses 
 
 
 304. See id. at 198. 
 305. See id. 
 306. See id. at 202. 
 307. See Ciruna & Braun, supra note 41, at 12–23. For a much more complete assessment of the 
many ecological and economic benefits of watersheds, see generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
RIPARIAN AREAS, FUNCTIONS AND STRATEGIES FOR MANAGEMENT (2002); NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, NEW STRATEGIES FOR AMERICA‘S WATERSHEDS (1999). 
 308. 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940). 
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that render waterways either not appropriate for complete private 
ownership or appropriate for some degree of public ownership and control. 
For some constitutional doctrines, navigability remains the most logical 
public value for the legal doctrines at issue, in particular federal admiralty 
jurisdiction. For Commerce Clause purposes, on the other hand, the 
Supreme Court has already acknowledged that a much broader range of 
uses and values are relevant. The two doctrines that directly implicate 
proprietary rights in water bodies, navigability for title and the federal 
navigational servitude, are more challenging in determining the continued 
relevance of navigability. 
1. Admiralty Jurisdiction 
On its face, the relevance of navigability to admiralty jurisdiction 
would appear to be a trivial question, but there is a much more expansive 
definition of ―navigability‖ today compared to 1851, when the Court first 
extended admiralty to inland waters.
309
 A more relevant inquiry, therefore, 
is whether navigability has become overly inclusive in terms of the 
functions that admiralty jurisdiction serves relative to other sources of 
federal authority.  
The initial rationale for admiralty jurisdiction on the high seas was 
―supervision over foreign trade and intercourse with other nations,‖310 and 
issues such as policing piracy and buccaneering.
311
 Navigability is 
obviously a given in those kinds of maritime cases, and the federal interest 
in those cases is manifest from the perspective of national defense and 
foreign policy. As Hamilton wrote in The Federalist, maritime cases ―so 
commonly affect the rights of foreigners that they fall within the 
considerations relative to the public peace.‖312 
When the Supreme Court expanded jurisdiction inland to include fresh 
waters, however, that jurisdiction applied to a wide range of claims that 
involved no foreign citizens and no issues of national defense or foreign 
policy.
313
 The narrowest rationale for that expansion in The Propeller 
 
 
 309. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). 
 310. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 489 (1847) (Woodbury, J., dissenting); see also 
Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 475 (1793); Waite, supra note 119, at 585. 
 311. See Conover, supra note 125, at 35–36. 
 312. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 313. See Waring, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (damages claim due to collision); Steamboat Orleans v. 
Phoebus, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 175 (1837) (boat ownership dispute); Hobart v. Drogan, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 
108 (1836) (salvage claim); Peyroux v. Howard, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324 (1833) (compensation claim for 
boat repairs); The Steam-Boat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825) (unpaid wage 
claims). 
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Genesee Chief was that a law passed by Congress expressly subjected the 
Great Lakes to admiralty jurisdiction, and that the Great Lakes are 
functionally no different from the high seas for purposes of the clearly 
national ―maritime trade‖ interests protected through federal admiralty 
jurisdiction.
314
 More broadly, the Court proclaimed that geographic 
differences between the United States and England justified an expanded 
view of admiralty to address the same kinds of cases based on the ―public 
character of the river‖ in question.315  
In later cases in which the Court extended federal admiralty jurisdiction 
to other navigable inland waters based on the more general language of the 
Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789, the rationale was not so 
limited but also not entirely clear. In accepting jurisdiction the same year 
over a case involving a collision on the Mississippi River above tidewater, 
the Court seems to have summarily assumed that the rationale in The 
Propeller Genesee Chief applied to other great inland waterways as 
well.
316
 In applying the doctrine to the purely intrastate waters of the 
Alabama River, the Court rooted its decision in the absence of any limiting 
language in the text of the Constitution, the exercise of inland admiralty 
jurisdiction in the colonies and early states, and the practical benefits of 
invoking uniform admiralty over the country‘s extensive system of inland 
waterways.
317
 Implicit in these decisions is the idea that federal admiralty 
jurisdiction provides a neutral forum to adjudicate cases involving vessels 
and associated commerce so that navigation in coastal states is not 
preferred over navigation and commerce in the central and western 
states.
318
 
Notably, this rationale for the inland expansion of federal admiralty 
jurisdiction predated two other significant developments in federal law, 
which together may reduce the need for that jurisdiction given expanded 
federal interest over matters that do not depend on navigability per se. The 
first was the fulfillment of federal question subject matter jurisdiction 
under the Judiciary Act of 1875, which provided federal courts with 
jurisdiction over any claim necessary to enforce applicable provisions of 
 
 
 314. The Propeller Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 453–54. 
 315. Id. at 455–56. 
 316. Fretz v. Bull, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 466, 468 (1851).  
 317. Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 298–302 (1857). 
 318. See Wilkinson, supra note 37, at 1221 (noting that Great Lakes states complained of 
discrimination when denied protection of admiralty courts), id. at 1235 (drawing analogy to Swift v. 
Tyson regarding need for federal uniformity to support growing interstate commerce); Conover, supra 
note 125, at 37 (discussing need for uniformity due to differences in state admiralty courts). 
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the Constitution or federal statute.
319
 The second was the dramatic 
expansion of federal Commerce Clause authority, under which Congress 
can address any perceived commercial inequities or other problems within 
the broad scope of that power.
320
 In this sense, perhaps Justice Story was 
correct when he suggested in 1825 that any inland limitations in admiralty 
jurisdiction could best be filled through legislative power under the 
Commerce Clause rather than judicial power under the admiralty clause.
321
 
Relegating federal control over inland cases involving vessel traffic to 
Commerce Clause rather than admiralty power, however, would change 
the relative roles of the judicial and legislative branches in meeting the 
goal of federal uniformity. That debate is well beyond the scope of this 
Article, and better left to experts in substantive admiralty and maritime 
law. Moreover, such a shift would reduce federal uniformity at least to 
some degree by allowing concurrent state court jurisdiction to enforce 
applicable federal statutes, whereas federal admiralty jurisdiction is 
exclusive.
322
 That shift would cut in both directions in terms of the ability 
to protect the wider range of public interests in waterways that are subject 
to the Commerce Clause and other sources of federal authority. On the one 
hand, those who seek the protection of those laws could do so through 
potentially more convenient state courts as well as federal courts. On the 
other hand, enforcement through state as well as federal courts would 
necessarily eliminate the uniformity inherent in federal admiralty 
jurisdiction. Any significant inconsistencies could be addressed through 
the Supreme Court‘s ultimate appellate authority over issues of federal 
law. 
2. Commerce Clause Authority 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the continuing relevance of 
navigability for Commerce Clause purposes appears similarly easy to 
answer. The scope of federal authority under the Commerce Clause far 
exceeds the limits of traditional navigable waters as delineated in The 
 
 
 319. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).  
 320. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 321. The Steam-Boat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428, 429 (1825) (―If the public 
inconvenience, from the want of a process of an analogous nature, shall be extensively felt, the 
attention of the Legislature will doubtless be drawn to the subject.‖). 
 322. The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555, 568–69 (1866); The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) 411, 430 (1866). 
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Daniel Ball,
323
 and even the broader test of navigability for Commerce 
Clause cases articulated in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power 
Co.
324
 Navigability is simply one subset of interstate or international 
―commerce‖ within the scope of Commerce Clause authority, although 
among the earliest to be recognized by the Supreme Court.
325
 
It is curious, then, that in a series of cases involving navigable waters, 
the Court has tied its decisions to navigability rather than the many other 
factors surrounding interstate or foreign commerce. For example, in 
deciding the constitutionality of a federal statute prohibiting thefts from 
shipwrecks, the Court declined to uphold admiralty jurisdiction over goods 
taken from above the mean high tide line because admiralty cases at the 
time extended only to waters influenced by the ebb and flow of the tide.
326
 
It upheld the applicability and constitutionality of the statute on 
Commerce Clause grounds, however, citing Gibbons and relying in large 
part on the similar connection to commerce on a navigable waterway: 
[Commerce Clause power] extends to such acts, done on land, 
which interfere with, obstruct, or prevent the due exercise of the 
power to regulate commerce and navigation with foreign nations, 
and among the states. Any offence which thus interferes with, 
obstructs, or prevents such commerce and navigation, though done 
on land, may be punished by [C]ongress, under its general authority 
to make all laws necessary and proper to execute their delegated 
constitutional powers.
327
 
If Congress can penalize theft of goods traded in interstate or foreign 
commerce, the mode of transportation should be irrelevant, as should the 
navigability of the waterway. 
Similarly, in The Daniel Ball, the Court upheld a federal statute 
regulating, for safety, an instrumentality of interstate commerce (a 
steamboat) that happened to be used on a navigable waterway. But the 
Court reserved for later cases a decision on whether the same authority 
would be justified with respect to similar instrumentalities of commerce 
on land, such as railroads.
328
 As such, the focus on navigability in The 
Daniel Ball—perhaps the most famous ―navigability‖ case in Supreme 
 
 
 323. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870). 
 324. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). 
 325. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).  
 326. United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 76–78 (1838). 
 327. Id. at 78. 
 328. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 566. 
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Court history—seems almost trivial. That the Grand River itself was 
navigable for commerce was self-evident; the case involved seizure of a 
steamboat that was actually in commercial use on the river. The real issue 
was federal authority to regulate an instrumentality of commerce of any 
kind when transporting goods as part of a ―continued highway for 
commerce, both with other States and with foreign countries.‖329 
Likewise, in cases upholding federal authority to build or regulate 
multi-purpose water projects, the Court relied heavily, but not exclusively, 
on the fact that those dams and related facilities were either located on 
navigable waters or would affect navigability downstream.
330
 To that 
extent, continued reliance on navigability as a legal basis for Commerce 
Clause power remained appropriate. To the extent that a project generates 
electric power available for sale in interstate markets,
331
 for Commerce 
Clause purposes there should be no difference between hydroelectric 
power and power generated from other sources with no connection to 
waterways at all. Similarly, if a federal dam has flood control and 
watershed protection benefits that affect interstate commerce in ways 
unrelated to navigation,
332
 it should matter not whether the dam is built on 
a navigable or a non-navigable river. 
The Court‘s fidelity to navigation to uphold Commerce Clause 
authority over matters related in any way to waterways could be explained 
in several related ways. First, due to fear of excess federal power,
333
 the 
Court in its early cases may have wanted to ground its decisions on the 
clearest and most politically acceptable reason: because commerce on 
navigable waters was the predominant mode by which interstate foreign 
commerce then occurred, it was the most logical way to uphold federal 
power over commerce. Second, because Gibbons was one of the Court‘s 
seminal Commerce Clause decisions, it may simply have been the legal 
pedigree on which ensuing cases relied, regardless of whether its rationale 
was the only plausible reason for upholding federal authority in later 
cases. Until the Supreme Court in Appalachian Electric Power began to 
 
 
 329. Id. at 564. 
 330. See supra notes 193–200 and accompanying text. 
 331. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 326 (1936). 
 332. See Okla. ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 520–22 (1941) (noting that 
floods cause significant financial losses and ―respect no state lines,‖ and ―that single states are 
impotent to cope with them effectively‖). 
 333. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison). 
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cleanse its Commerce Clause jurisprudence of unnecessary reliance on the 
concept,
334
 navigability may simply have taken on a legal life of its own. 
An alternative and potentially simpler explanation for the Supreme 
Court‘s persistent reliance on navigability as a sina qua non of Commerce 
Clause power whenever a body of water was at issue is that Congress, 
perhaps in light of the Supreme Court‘s holdings in Gibbons and progeny, 
habitually invoked navigability as the surest hook on which to hang its 
Commerce Clause hat. When deciding Commerce Clause challenges based 
on statutes such as the Federal Power Act of 1920,
335
 the Flood Control 
Act of 1936,
336
 the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
337
 (as in Appalachian 
Electric Power, Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips, and Kaiser Aetna, 
respectively), the Court begins its analysis with the statutory assertion of 
federal authority, and only if necessary decides whether implementation of 
the statute under those circumstances is constitutional.
338
 
The line of federal statutes and cases governing water pollution control 
illustrates this tendency. In the Rivers and Harbors Act, Congress 
authorized the Secretary of the Army to permit or prohibit activities that 
would obstruct navigable waters for purposes of commerce and national 
defense. In this statute, Congress acted to safeguard the navigability of 
navigable rivers, and therefore the geographic target of federal regulation 
was plainly the ―navigable capacity of any waters of the United States.‖339 
However, before Congress amended the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act (FWPCA, later renamed the Clean Water Act (CWA))
340
 to address 
water pollution for reasons that significantly transcend navigability,
341
 the 
Supreme Court affirmed the applicability of the Rivers and Harbors Act to 
redress industrial water pollution independent of navigability.
342
 Thus, 
Congress based the jurisdictional reach of the Rivers and Harbors Act on 
traditional notions of navigability, but the Army enforced the law for 
broader but still constitutionally valid purposes. 
 
 
 334. I emphasize ―unnecessary‖ because navigability clearly remains relevant where Commerce 
Clause power is asserted to promote navigability for interstate or international commerce.  
 335. 16 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. (2012). 
 336. 33 U.S.C. §§ 701a–701f, 701h (2012). 
 337. 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 407, 411 (2012). 
 338. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs., 531 U.S. 159 
(2001) (unnecessary to reach Commerce Clause challenge where federal action rejected as beyond 
statutory jurisdiction). 
 339. 32 U.S.C. § 403 (2012). 
 340. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2012). 
 341. See id. § 1251 (articulating wide range of congressional water quality goals). 
 342. United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973); United States v. Standard Oil 
Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966). See generally William H. Rodgers, Industrial Water Pollution and the 
Refuse Act, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 761 (1971). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1696 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1643 
 
 
 
 
Congress amended the FWPCA in 1972 to adopt a comprehensive 
national scheme of water pollution control.
343
 Rather than focusing on 
navigation, Congress sought to protect fish and wildlife, public recreation, 
human and environmental health, and more broadly ―to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation‘s 
waters.‖344 Borrowing from the Rivers and Harbors Act, Congress first 
defined a ―discharge of a pollutant‖ to mean ―any addition of any pollutant 
to navigable waters‖345 and then redefined ―navigable waters‖ to mean 
―the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.‖346 
What explains these definitional gymnastics? In The Daniel Ball, the 
Supreme Court distinguished between waters deemed ―navigable in fact‖ 
because they are used or are useful as a highway for commerce, and 
navigable waters of the United States, which require that they form or be 
part of ―a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried 
on with other States or foreign countries.‖347 The former test governs title 
cases, in which no interstate commerce is necessary, while the latter 
supports Commerce Clause authority. Although Congress used the same 
―waters of the United States‖ language as The Daniel Ball, it did not likely 
intend to distinguish between these two categories of waters in the same 
sense. If Congress based CWA jurisdiction on navigability rather than 
other effects on interstate commerce, the distinction would be superfluous 
because waters used exclusively for intrastate commerce would not pass 
Commerce Clause scrutiny. If Congress asserted Commerce Clause 
authority based on the broader effects authorized in Appalachian Electric 
Power Co., such as the economic effects of water pollution,
348
 navigability 
would not be relevant at all. 
The legislative history of the 1972 amendments indicates that Congress 
intended the ―waters of the United States‖ to cover water bodies to the 
maximum extent permissible under the Constitution, and to ―regulate at 
least some waters that would not be deemed ‗navigable‘ under the 
classical understanding of that term.‖349 Thus, in U.S. v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Justice White explained, ―[a]lthough the [Clean Water] Act 
 
 
 343. See generally ROBERT W. ADLER, JESSICA C. LANDMAN & DIANE M. CAMERON, THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT, 20 YEARS LATER 6–9 (1993). 
 344. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), (a)(2)–(3). 
 345. Id. § 1362(12). 
 346. Id. § 1362(7). 
 347. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870) (emphasis added). 
 348. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 343, at 1–2. 
 349. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985) (citing S. Conf. Rep. 
No. 92-1236, p. 144 (1972); 118 CONG. REC. 33756–33757 (1972) (statement of Rep. Dingell)). 
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prohibits discharges into ‗navigable waters,‘ the Act‘s definition of 
‗navigable waters‘ as ‗the waters of the United States‘ makes it clear that 
the term ‗navigable‘ as used in the Act is of limited import.‖350 
If Congress intended to assert Commerce Clause jurisdiction unlimited 
by the concept of navigability, why did it use the term ―navigable‖ at all, 
rather than simply using the phrase ―waters of the United States?‖ This 
paradox has plagued the Supreme Court
351
 and lower courts,
352
 and has 
been the subject of conflicting commentary
353
 and proposals in Congress 
to amend the CWA to broaden the grounds on which Congress asserts 
constitutional power.
354
 One plausible explanation is that navigability 
again had taken on a legal life of its own, or that Congress was simply 
drawn in by the history of past federal legislation. Another is that in the 
pivotal permitting requirement of the CWA,
355
 Congress intended to assert 
jurisdiction over discharges to navigable waters to the fullest extent 
constitutionally permissible. Under Appalachian Electric Power Co., that 
would include non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters
356
 or 
hydrologically connected wetlands, the use or degradation of which would 
adversely affect traditional navigable waters.
357
 On the other hand, it 
would exclude from the CWA permit requirements regarding discharges to 
other ―waters‖ that have insufficient connection to waters deemed 
―navigable waters of the United States.‖ That was precisely the 
explanation provided by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County v. United States: 
We cannot agree that Congress‘ separate definitional use of the 
phrase ―waters of the United States‖ constitutes a basis for reading 
the term ―navigable waters‖ out of the statute. We said in Riverside 
 
 
 350. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133.  
 351. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook 
Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng‘rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121. 
 352. Compare United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003), with In re Needham, 354 
F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003) (presenting competing interpretations of Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook 
Cnty.); compare also N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir. 2006), 
with United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 615 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (presenting 
competing interpretations of Rapanos). 
 353. See, e.g., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT: FIVE ESSAYS (L. Kinvin 
Wroth ed., 2007) (presenting five highly different approaches to interpreting Rapanos v. United 
States). 
 354. See Clean Water Restoration Act of 2007, H.R. 2421, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 355. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012). 
 356. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3. 
 357. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985); see also Rapanos v. 
United States, 547 U.S. 715, 759 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (authorizing CWA jurisdiction over 
discharges to waters with a ―significant nexus‖ to navigable waters). 
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Bayview Homes that the word ―navigable‖ in the statute was of 
―limited import‖. . . . But it is one thing to give a word limited effect 
and quite another to give it no effect whatever. The term 
―navigable‖ has at least the import of showing us what Congress 
had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional 
jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or 
which could reasonably be so made.
358
 
That perspective is notable given Justice Rehnquist‘s statement in Kaiser 
Aetna that ―navigability of a waterway adds little if anything to the breadth 
of Congress‘ regulatory power over interstate commerce.‖359 Most 
recently, in the context of a related issue of administrative law,
360
 the 
Supreme Court lamented the fact that Congress has confused the 
jurisdictional grounds for its exercise of Commerce Clause authority in the 
CWA.
361
 
The key point here is not to resolve the longstanding dispute over what 
Congress intended in its curious definitions in the CWA. It is that the 
water pollution statutes provide a good example of how the use of 
navigability to support Commerce Clause authority is rooted in history, 
but is not bound by it, and based on a correct reading of Gibbons v. 
Ogden, never was. Navigability is but one of many sources of Commerce 
Clause power. From a constitutional perspective, the concept of 
navigability for Commerce Clause purposes is of ―limited import,‖ and is 
useful only to define that subset of power invoked to protect commerce 
through waterborne navigation. In drafting statutes such as the Clean 
Water Act, the lesson here may be for Congress. If its intent is to exercise 
Commerce Clause legislative power solely to protect the navigability of 
navigable waters, as was arguably true in the Rivers and Harbors Act, 
continued reliance on the term ―navigable waters‖ remains appropriate. If 
it intends to assert Commerce Clause authority on broader grounds, 
however, continued reliance on navigability only sows seeds of confusion.  
 
 
 358. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng‘rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 
(2001). 
 359. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 173 (1979). 
 360. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 136 (2012) (holding EPA compliance order final for purposes of 
review). 
 361. Id. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring) (―Real relief requires Congress to do what it should have 
done in the first place: provide a reasonably clear rule regarding the reach of the Clean Water Act.‖). 
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3. Public and Private Property in Waterways 
This brings us back to the opening question suggested by the PPL 
Montana evidentiary dilemma. As shown above, the relevance of inland 
navigability to admiralty jurisdiction is trivial at best and perhaps has 
outlived its utility in the wake of subsequent constitutional developments. 
The relevance of navigability has faded into the background of Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence. What, then, is the continuing relevance of 
navigability to the related issue of public versus private proprietary rights 
in inland bodies of water, particularly when the evidentiary viability of 
―navigability at statehood‖ as a measure of those rights becomes 
increasingly difficult as time passes? 
Although logical and consistent in some ways, navigability as the 
solitary test to allocate trust ownership between the federal government 
and the states remains perplexing. On adoption of the Constitution, the 
states ceded to the federal government plenary authority over interstate 
and foreign commerce,
362
 which the Supreme Court decided early in U.S. 
history includes navigation.
363
 Therefore, in many respects it is 
counterintuitive that states hold title to lands submerged beneath navigable 
waterways, while the federal government can only hold title to non-
navigable waters, and then only by virtue of riparian proprietorship. Chief 
Justice Roberts noted this irony during oral arguments in PPL Montana.
364
 
One possible explanation for this anomaly is that the federal 
government asserts independent authority over navigable waters under the 
Commerce Clause and the corollary doctrine of the federal navigational 
servitude. But why then should state law control the disposition of trust 
lands and associated waters supposedly held for purposes over which the 
federal government retains plenary control?
365
 In some cases the Supreme 
Court held that public trust title enhances state regulatory authority to 
preserve and protect waterways for the originally stated purposes of 
navigation, commerce and fisheries, or for expanded trust purposes later 
adopted pursuant to state law.
366
 But it is not entirely clear why states 
 
 
 362. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 363. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 364. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, PPL Montana v. State, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012) (No. 
10-218). Nothing in the PPL Montana decision, however, changes this principle.  
 365. Earlier authors have made similar comments. See Leighty, supra note 3, at 436 (suggesting 
that the courts have placed too much focus on title); MacGrady, supra note 3, at 604–05 (arguing that 
bed title is irrelevant to control of navigable waters). 
 366. See, e.g., McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (upholding state law prohibiting non-
citizens from planting or harvesting oysters on state-owned tidal lands); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 
(18 How.) 71, 74–75 (1855) (holding that state authority to protect shellfish beds derived in part from 
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could not accomplish similar functions without holding complete title to 
the beds underlying navigable waters, either under police power 
authority
367
 or under a split title concept in which private owners hold title 
to the jus privitum and the state retains the jus publicum as recognized in 
English law.
368
 Moreover, the states may dispose of title underlying 
navigable waters so long as they do not substantially impair trust purposes. 
This increased the degree to which the federal government relied on the 
federal navigational servitude to protect the very same purposes, free from 
the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
The important point here is not to revisit the debate over whether 
American courts correctly interpreted the English distinction between tidal 
waters and inland waters as the basis of navigability as opposed to other 
factors when allocating public or private proprietary rights or federal 
versus state ownership and control. Rather, two key points are important 
with respect to the continuing relevance of navigability in U.S. 
constitutional law. First, whether correct as a matter of legal inheritance, 
U.S. courts at both the state and federal levels did view navigability as a 
key factor in allocating property rights among private landowners and the 
government, in trust for the public to secure an important form of common 
liberty. That made perfect sense when navigability was a defining 
characteristic of American rivers and other waters. On the other hand, 
given the triad of purposes for which such waters were protected—
navigation, commerce, and fisheries—it is not entirely clear why 
navigability (as opposed to ―fishability‖ or commercial potential more 
broadly) was the sole factor in allocating public and private rights, or 
federal versus state power. Second, both state and federal courts felt it 
appropriate to modify English legal concepts to suit the different and 
changing conditions of a new country and continent, despite significant 
resulting changes in the allocation of property rights and interests between 
both the government and individuals and between the federal and state 
governments. 
Justice Rehnquist‘s distinction in Kaiser Aetna raises anew the 
question of why one subset of Commerce Clause power is partially 
insulated from takings analysis (absent physical invasion or other 
 
 
ownership of beds of tidal waters, but also from ―legislative power‖). In McCready, it seems more 
likely that ownership would confer greater authority because, absent the state ownership rationale, 
exclusion of out-of-state citizens might have violated the Commerce Clause, whereas the regulation in 
Smith would seem squarely within state police power authority even absent ownership. 
 367. See Frazier, supra note 68, at 91; MacGrady, supra note 3, at 604–05. 
 368. See Lazarus, supra note 72, at 636; Leighty, supra note 3, at 396. 
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significant impairment of property rights associated with fast land), while 
other exercises of Commerce Clause authority are not. One possible 
answer is the extent to which the Court emphasized the sheer importance 
of control over navigation as a central goal of the Commerce Clause.
369
 
That distinction hardly seems persuasive, however, absent any textual 
distinction between protection of navigable waters and other valid 
Commerce Clause goals in the few bare words of the Commerce Clause.
370
 
It is somewhat akin to arguing that the Framers authorized regulation of 
commerce generally, but really intended regulation of navigable waters 
even to the extent that Fifth Amendment protections should not apply. 
A far more logical explanation for the privileged position of the federal 
government is that it does have a proprietary interest in rivers and other 
waters that puts it in a superior position relative to takings claims than for 
other exercises of Commerce Clause authority. That proprietary interest, in 
turn, logically derives from the full range of public versus private rights in 
bodies of water as the Supreme Court and many state courts have now 
recognized via both the Commerce Clause and state public trust doctrines. 
Recall that, in early English and American decisions, ownership rights 
in ―public waters‖ were divided between a jus privatum, which defined the 
riparian rights of landowners relative to other private individuals, and a jus 
publicum, in which the sovereign retains in trust for the public at large 
those rights in rivers and other water bodies necessary to protect shared 
common resources.
371
 The Supreme Court affirmed this public ownership 
concept to allow states to retain various rights on behalf of the public.
372
 
Through the Commerce Clause, the states surrendered to the federal 
government a portion of the power to control those waters for the broad 
purposes of promoting and regulating interstate and foreign commerce. 
 
 
 369. See, e.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62 (1913) 
(describing ―the great and absolute power of Congress over the improvement of navigable rivers‖); 
Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 625 (1900) (describing ―the paramount jurisdiction of Congress 
over the navigable waters of the United States‖); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 
174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899) (alluding to ―the superior power of the General Government to secure the 
uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams within the limits of the United States‖); 
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 335 (1893) (―[T]he power of Congress 
over such natural highways as navigable streams is confessedly supreme.‖). 
 370. ―The Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.‖ U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 371. See Lazarus, supra note 72, at 636; Leighty, supra note 3, at 396; Tillinghast, supra note 70, 
at 344. Lazarus further identified the jus regium, the royal right to manage resources for public safety 
and welfare, i.e., what became known in the United States as the ―police power.‖ 
 372. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d‘Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 286 (1997); Shively v. 
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1894); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435–37, 452–53 (1892); 
R.R. v. Schurmeir, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272, 287 (1868). 
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Thus, in Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, Chief Justice Taney explained that 
the people of the states ―hold the absolute right to all their navigable 
waters, and the soils under them for their own common use, subject only to 
the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the general 
government.‖373 The Court emphasized the same reservation when it held 
that newly admitted states have the same ownership and control of 
navigable waters as the original states,
374
 and when it first articulated the 
federal navigational servitude: 
All navigable waters are under the control of the United States for 
the purpose of regulating and improving navigation, and although 
the title to the shore and submerged soil is in the various States, and 
individual owners under them, it is always subject to the servitude 
in respect of navigation created in favor of the Federal government 
by the Constitution.
375
 
By all appearances, in defining the scope of this servitude, navigability 
took on a rhetorical life of its own, much as it did for Commerce Clause 
purposes. The servitude arose mainly in the context of conflicts between 
federal projects to control and improve navigation, when waterborne 
transportation remained a driving force in the U.S. economy, and when 
Commerce Clause authority was governed by the definition of navigability 
in The Daniel Ball. Because of those roots, it became known as the 
―navigational‖ servitude. If the servitude is grounded in the Commerce 
Clause, however, it should no more be bound to the navigational subset of 
Commerce Clause authority than is true for other exercises of that 
power.
376
 Bodies of water logically should be covered by the servitude to 
the full extent that public uses and values in water bodies are properly 
within the reach of the Commerce Clause, as suggested in Twin City 
Power and Grand River Dam.
377
 
Likewise, navigability appears to have taken on a legal life of its own 
in defining state proprietary rights in waterways. At least as American 
courts interpreted English common law at the time of U.S. independence, 
 
 
 373. Martin v. Waddell‘s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842) (emphasis added). 
 374. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845) (―Then to Alabama belong the navigable 
waters, and soils under them . . . subject to the rights surrendered by the Constitution to the United 
States . . . .‖) (emphasis added)). 
 375. Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271–72 (1897); see also United States v. Rio Grande 
Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1889) (state water rights remain ―limited by the superior power of 
the General Government to secure the uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams‖). 
 376. See supra Part II.C. 
 377. See supra Part II.D. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss6/3
  
 
 
 
 
2013] DECLINING ROLE OF NAVIGABILITY 1703 
 
 
 
 
the public retained, in its governmental capacity, a proprietary interest in 
coastal waters and tidal waters
378
 because they were deemed to be so 
inherently public that full private domination would be inconsistent with 
the idea of common liberty in shared public resources. Although some of 
those tidal waters were also navigable, not all were, as the Supreme Court 
confirmed in Phillips Petroleum.
379
 Moreover, the purposes to which that 
public ownership attached were not limited to navigation. They initially 
included fisheries and other forms of commerce, and later embraced other 
public uses and values as well.
380
 Thus, when the Supreme Court expanded 
the scope of state proprietary control of waters to include inland in 
additional to tidal waters that were navigable in fact,
381
 it was influenced 
by the dominant public utility of waterways at the time, which was 
navigation. As discussed above, navigation has now receded as the most 
important public use of waters, and has been replaced by equally 
important values such as aquatic ecosystem services (including fisheries 
and wildlife habitat and biodiversity protection) and public recreational 
uses. There is no reason that state proprietary control should not match the 
legitimate scope of those other valid public interests in their waterways. 
Indeed, private technical title to the beds and banks of waterways has 
never implied private ownership either of the water itself
382
 or of fish and 
wildlife resources supported by the aquatic ecosystem.
383
 
This recognition of a broader range of public proprietary interests in 
bodies of water, and a concomitantly broader geographic scope of those 
rights as applied either to the federal servitude in public waters or to the 
state public trust doctrine, suggest potential conflicts with the takings 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, respectively.
384
 The fact 
that the Supreme Court and state courts recognized broader public 
proprietary rights in water bodies in the past, however, did not reflect an 
expansion of public relative to private rights. Rather, it reflected a judicial 
recognition of public rights inherent to those public resources to begin 
with. Given that the sovereign, whether the federal government or the 
state, holds those resources in trust for the public at large, they can never 
 
 
 378. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821); Martin v. Waddell‘s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 
(1842). 
 379. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988). 
 380. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 381. Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 324 (1876). 
 382. See Nat‘l. Audubon Soc‘y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Colo. 1983) (applying public trust 
principles to upstream water diversions). 
 383. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
 384. U.S. CONST., amends. V, XIV. 
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simply be surrendered in ways that interfere substantially with the 
purposes for which they are held.
385
 A contrary result would constitute a 
private taking of public property rather than vice versa. 
Moreover, the concept of public ―ownership‖ in the sense of 
proprietary interests in public aquatic resources does not necessarily 
infringe existing title to the beds of water bodies, to the extent that such 
title has been recognized under state law. The entire history of water body 
ownership, however, supports the expectation that such title is held subject 
to dominant public interests in public resources, such as the flow of the 
stream and the wildlife therein. Proper judicial recognition of those public 
interests no more constitutes a taking of private property than did the U.S. 
Supreme Court‘s recognition in Packer v. Bird386 that state ownership 
included inland navigable waters or the California Supreme Court‘s 
recognition in National Audubon Society that state public trust interests 
extended to withdrawal rights from upstream tributaries.
387
 On the other 
hand, respect for existing recognized private property rights suggests that 
public proprietary interests should be asserted and accepted judicially only 
to the extent necessary to protect those legitimate public uses and values in 
waterways, whether grounded in public navigation or in other public uses 
and values. 
Perhaps the problem with the litigation in PPL Montana was that it 
focused so narrowly on ownership of technical title to the beds and the 
banks of waterways under a doctrine that focused for so long on 
navigability for title. Under an alternative view, Montana might have 
asserted proprietary rights associated with the public power production 
potential of publicly owned waters. Whether those rights came in the form 
of title to the beds of the rivers in question or royalties charged for use of 
the state-owned water may have been irrelevant to the result. Similarly, if 
private hydropower production impairs public rights in fisheries or other 
public uses and values, perhaps the state could assert proprietary interests 
based on its trust ownership of those resources.  
 
 
 385. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Water, water, every where 
And all the boards did shrink; 
Water, water, every where, 
Ne any drop to drink.
388
 
As suggested by the Rime of the Ancyent Marinere, water is 
fundamental to the health and welfare of all communities, especially when 
scarce. As such, it is traditionally considered to be a public resource that 
cannot be ―owned‖ in the same sense as other resources. But so are waters, 
meaning the rivers, lakes, and other surface waters that not only supply 
water but also confer a wide range of other significant public benefits. 
For nearly the entire history of the United States, the Supreme Court—
and to a large degree Congress—has seized on navigability as the use and 
value that defines water bodies as ―public‖ for purposes of several distinct 
constitutional doctrines, including admiralty jurisdiction, Commerce 
Clause authority and the federal navigational servitude, and ownership of 
the beds of water bodies. That focus of constitutional doctrine, however, 
arose and evolved when the nation‘s coastal waters and rivers were its 
most important highways for commerce, and a driving force in national 
settlement and economic development. Although maritime and inland 
waters continue to serve significant transportation functions, they are not 
nearly as significant as they once were, and indeed have not been since the 
middle of the nineteenth century. At the same time, the uses of water 
bodies for a much wider range of public economic values have grown 
significantly, and the public ecological benefits provided by those waters 
are much more clearly understood. 
U.S. constitutional law has kept pace with these evolving uses and 
values of waterways only to some degree, and in ways that logically varied 
according to the purpose of each navigability test. Navigability necessarily 
will remain a useful doctrine in constitutional law for some purposes, such 
as defining the limits of admiralty jurisdiction, even while Commerce 
Clause authority and other sources of federal court jurisdiction have 
expanded and the need for such jurisdiction has become less acute. The 
relevance of navigability to Commerce Clause jurisprudence has declined 
as courts have acknowledged the many other ways in which the use and 
degradation of water and waterways can affect interstate and international 
commerce. The two constitutional doctrines that delineate public and 
 
 
 388. Coleridge, supra note 1, at 773. 
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private proprietary interests in the nation‘s waterways, ―navigability for 
title‖ and the ―federal navigational servitude,‖ remain locked into an early 
nineteenth century understanding of the reasons for which those waters are 
―public.‖ Those doctrines should evolve as well. The geographic limits of 
public waters should reflect the full range of uses and values that serve 
important public interests, and for which unbridled private ownership is 
not appropriate, to the fullest extent consistent to the underlying purposes 
of those doctrines. 
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